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I.

INTRODUCTION

Antitrust law is tricky to apply, particularly when it comes to
innovation. In non-patent cases, courts face an already formidable task of
digesting market data and weighing opposing economic evidence to
understand the market effects of price-output decisions.1 Patent cases
impose an additional challenge. Courts must choose between competing
narratives knowing their decisions may influence innovation across
multiple industries.2
Curbing the rights of patentees could make the patented technology
cheaper and improve its dissemination. However, it also risks dampening
incentives to innovate. Conversely, giving patentees unbridled freedom
might make investing in technology less risky and more lucrative, but
licensees and consumers may pay more for the technology and receive less
in return. To arbitrate between these narratives, courts must imagine a
counterfactual world without the patentee’s allegedly offensive conduct and
compare it against the alternative.
United States v. Microsoft Corp. is widely regarded as the seminal IPantitrust opinion.3 Yet even there, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
in candidly observed that “neither plaintiffs nor the court can confidently
reconstruct a product’s hypothetical technological development in a world
absent the defendant’s exclusionary conduct.”4 More recently Chief Justice
1

Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 731–32 (1977) (stressing “the uncertainties and
difficulties in analyzing price and output decisions ‘in the real economic world rather than an
economist’s hypothetical model.’”).
2
For instance, the controversies related to standard essential patents impact not only the
smartphone space but also the “Internet of Things.” See, e.g., Kenie Ho, Internet of Things:
Another Industry Patent War?, LANDSLIDE (2015), available at http://www.finnegan.com/res
ources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=1031eb8f-a92a-4dca-9664-0e6169ae819a.
3
253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
4
Id.; Intel, Apple, Google, Microsoft, and Facebook: Observations on Antitrust and the HighTech Sector, 2 ECKSTROM’S LICENSING IN FOR. & DOM. OPS. Appendix 8E-EE. Microsoft
integrated its Internet Explorer browser with its Windows operating system (OS). Microsoft, 253
F.3d at 65, 74. It was accused of making a predatory design change to allow it to leverage its
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Roberts noted in a dissenting opinion that, “patent policy encompasses a set
of judgments about the proper tradeoff between competition and the
incentive to innovate over the long run,” and “[a]ntitrust’s rule of reason
was not designed for such judgments and is not adept at making them.”5 In
the face of judges doubting their ability to competently adjudicate
competing narratives on the patentee’s conduct’s effect on innovation,
courts have generally deferred to patentees.6
Courts, guided by neoclassical economic thinking, assume that markets
self-correct and that high-tech industries move too quickly for antitrust to
effectively regulate.7 Neoclassical economics informs the modern antitrust
enterprise, and assumes decision makers can accurately estimate the utility
of their decisions and maximize that unity.8 Monopoly profits spur
innovation, and courts should guard against inefficient and unsuccessful

dominance in the personal computer OS market into the browser market while also fending off
Java’s browser threat to Windows. Id.
5
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2246 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
6
See infra Part II. See also Rita Coco, Antitrust Liability for Refusal to License Intellectual
Property: A Comparative Analysis and the International Setting, 12 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY L. REV. 1 (2008) (“[D]ifferent courts have granted IP owners diverse degrees of
immunity from antitrust enforcement, ranging from absolute immunity to the denial of any
immunity whatsoever, although with a clear bias in favor of IP.”); Christopher R. Leslie,
Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 342 (2010) (“[A]ntitrust jurisprudence
now improperly advantages defendants.”).
7
Ronald A. Cass, Antitrust for High-Tech and Low: Regulation, Innovation, and Risk, 9 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 169, 169–70 (2013) (“Traditional problems of regulation generally, and of
antitrust enforcement specifically, are exaggerated in high-technology sectors, where antitrust
enforcers’ abilities to understand and predict industry evolution are most limited and where
enforcement actions are most likely to rest on debatable predicates about the effects of specific
conduct.”). Neoclassical economics reflects the influence of the Chicago School, Post-Chicago
School, and Harvard School, which rely on the assumption of rationality as a central tenet in their
analyses. See William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for
Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 14–
15 (2007) (“[T]he Chicago/Harvard double helix provides the basic intellectual DNA for U.S.
antitrust jurisprudence today and, by shaping doctrine, constrains the enforcement choices of
antitrust agencies.”).
8
GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976) (noting that
people “maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount
of information and other inputs in a variety of markets.”).
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rivals using antitrust law to hamper successful patentees.9 There is little
doubt that today, “antitrust worships at the shrine of rationality.”10
Critics of neoclassical economics, however, see it as “unrealistic,”11 and
argue that faith in self-correcting markets and skepticism toward antitrust
enforcement fetters the ability of courts to deal with patent abuses.12
Advances in neuroscience and behavioral psychology suggest that courts
may be reluctant to intervene, in part, because of an aversion to the possible
loss in innovation incentives their decisions might cause compared to
possible gains, despite the indeterminacy of either in many cases based on
current jurisprudential methods.13
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc. has
hastened the need for courts to articulate how patents should be regulated
by antitrust law. The Court rejected the “scope of the patent” approach
adopted by some lower courts that immunized a patent owner from antitrust
scrutiny if that conduct fell within a patent’s scope.14 Instead, the Court
required courts to consider both patent and antitrust policies to define the
locus of a patentee’s rights when they result in anticompetitive harm to

9

See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1071 (10th Cir. 2013).
Leslie, supra note 6, at 265; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 134
(2005) (“[T]he entire antitrust enterprise is dedicated to the proposition that business firms behave
rationally.”).
11
Andreas Heinemann, Behavioural Antitrust: A “More Realistic Approach” to Competition
Law, EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON BEHAVIOURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 2 (Klaus Mathis ed.,
2015) (suggesting behavioral economics as the “urgently needed” alternative to “the Chicago
approach [with] its focus on theoretical models which are often far away from the reality of
markets.”).
12
See infra Part II.
13
See infra Part II. See also Matthew Sipe, Patents, Antitrust, and Preemption (Mar. 7, 2016),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2743701 (“The dissonance
between patent law and antitrust law has persisted despite a century of varied attempts at
harmonization.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 76
OHIO ST. L.J. 467, 511–12 (2015) (“Overall, the existing literature provides very little insight into
the effects of either specific patent or antitrust rules on economic performance.”); Benjamin Kern,
Innovation Markets, Future Markets, or Potential Competition: How Should Competition
Authorities Account for Innovation Competition in Merger Reviews?, 37 WORLD COMPETITION:
L.
AND
ECON.
REV.
173,
173
(2014),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2380130 (“[T]here is a broad consensus
among lawyers and economists on the enormous importance of innovation, it is still
controversially debated how exactly innovation should be taken into account.”).
14
F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2242 (2013).
10
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market competition.15 The shift reflects the maturity and confidence of a
Supreme Court prepared to require more careful antitrust analysis of patent
rights knowing that there will be no easy answers.16
Antitrust statutes are sparsely worded, and the Supreme Court
recognized antitrust law’s “dynamic potential” to be retooled with “new
wisdom.”17 Indeed, two years after Actavis, the Court in Kimble v. Marvel
Entm’t, LLC affirmed that the responsibility Congress entrusted to courts to
actively develop antitrust law in general also applied to the patent-antitrust
intersection.18 In a post-Actavis world where courts have more discretion,
the impact of biases on the outcome of patent-antitrust cases will be
amplified.
This Article argues that courts should operationalize insights offered by
behavioral economics in developing jurisprudence at the patent-antritrust
interface. Behavioral economics teaches that people, including judges,
patentees, licensees, and consumers navigate the world with imperfect
knowledge and rely on heuristics to guide them.19 Heuristics represent much
of what we do, and generally help us navigate instantaneously through our
world using only our associative memory.20 These mental short cuts bypass
laborious computations of facts, values, and probabilities.21 At the same
15

Id. at 2231.
Id. at 2237–38 (noting the “complexities” that will result from its ruling, and leaving it to
lower courts to structure the rule).
17
Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988). See also Joshua D.
Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War with Each Other, 121
YALE L.J. 2216, 2233 (2012) (“With brevity uncharacteristic of modern statutes, Congress gave
the courts substantial latitude for shaping antitrust doctrine.”).
18
135 S. Ct. 2401, 2418 (2015).
19
Behavioral economics traces its roots to the work of Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon on
“bounded rationality” in the 1950s, and became recognized as an economic discipline in the 1970s
when Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky identified heuristics and supplied
an alternative model to rational choice theory. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND
SLOW 20–24 (2011) (dividing human action between the automatic and involuntary and the
effortful, deliberate, conscious, and introspective).
20
Id. at 416.
21
For instance, one study showed that only one in a thousand read the terms and conditions of
online purchases; a study that, unlike offline purchases, could be conducted with great precision.
See David Currie, Homo Economicus and Homo Sapiens: The CMA Experience of Behavioural
Economics, New Zealand Commerce Commission Public Lecture (April 21, 2015) (transcript
available
at
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/david-currie-speaks-about-the-cmaexperience-of-behavioural-economics) (noting that those terms can run up to 29,000 words.
Further, consumers in mobile telephone routinely under and overestimate their data usage. About
16
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time, these heuristics may sometimes be led astray by biases in computation
and implementation,22 both by individuals and by firms.23
Biases in computation cause people to prefer the status quo, and be
more averse to losses than they are desirous of gains.24 Status quo biases
affect the willingness of licensees and consumers to switch to alternatives.25
Loss aversion may lead consumers to show greater responsiveness to price
increases than price decreases. Courts factoring these biases will estimate
market power more accurately, enabling them to better adjudicate claims
such as those involving patent holdups.26 Loss aversion also dampens the
willingness of courts to intervene when anticompetitive harm has been
alleged.27
Biases in implementation color the plausibility of exclusionary conduct
by patentees, its likely net effect on competition, and ultimately the court’s
impetus to intervene as well.28 A court that believes improper exclusion
rarely occurs may accept that the accused conduct was ineffective in
monopolizing the market,29 and that patentees’ justifications are
procompetitive.30 For instance a court may discount consumers’
susceptibility to hyperbolic discounting, which favors immediate payoffs
over long-term costs, and drives consumers to decisions that may harm
them eventually. Hyperbolic discounting may impact the analysis of tying,
exclusive dealing, and other types of restrictive licensing terms.31

15 percent suffer from over-confidence bias and pay excess usage charges, while half are overlyconservative and select a package with more usage than needed.).
22
Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1729, 1732 (1998) (“[B]ehavioral studies show that humans use fundamentally defective
heuristics to simplify choices made under conditions of uncertainty.”); EDWARD CARTWRIGHT,
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 27 (2d ed. 2014); see also, e.g., David Berreby, Emonomics, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/books/review/Berreby-t.html.
23
Heinemann, supra note 11, at 4.
24
See Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone II, Misbehavioral Economics: The Case Against
Behavioral Antitrust, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1517, 1530–31 (2012).
25
See infra Part IV.D.
26
Matthew Bennett et al., The Jevons Colloquium: Behavioral Economics in Consumer
Protection and Competition Law: What Does Behavioral Economics Mean for Competition
Policy?, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 111, 111, 114–16, 120 (2010).
27
See infra Part II.
28
See infra Part IV.
29
See infra Part IV.A.1.
30
See infra Part IV.B.3.
31
See infra Part IV.
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Behavioral economics has been embraced in finance and implemented
by the government.32 In IP law, scholars have argued it can inform nonobviousness analyses, decipher patent damages, and develop a more
nuanced narrative for incentivizing innovation.33 In antitrust law, scholars
have argued for a larger role for behavioral economics in antitrust law more
generally.34 Yet to date, there has been no consideration of the role of
behavioral economics at the patent-antitrust intersection.
In presenting pioneering work on the issue, this Article explains the role
heuristics and biases play at the patent-antitrust intersection, and identifies
specific ways that courts can take them into account. If antitrust law based
on neoclassical economics were analogized to an app, behavioral economics
would be a patch, not an overhaul of the status quo.35 A court that
understands how patentees, licensees, consumers, and enforcers decide can
more accurately contextualize and assess competing narratives and

32

Michael A. Salinger et al., Economics at the FTC: Pharmaceutical Patent Dispute
Settlements and Behavioral Economics 17 (2007), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/reports/economics-ftc-pharmaceutical-patent-dispute-settlements-and-behavioraleconomics/salingerschragippolito_rio2007.pdf; see RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MEYERS,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 333–36 (10th ed. 2011) (explaining anomalies with the
“efficient market hypothesis”).
33
William Hubbard, The Debilitating Effect of Exclusive Rights: Patents and Productive
Inefficiency, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2045, 2051 (2014) (“Patent law scholars thus have not recognized
that firms and individuals often do not maximize their profits and that this overlooked economic
insight contradicts fundamental assumptions lying at the heart of current patent policy.”); Thomas
F. Cotter, Patent Damages Heuristics, 24 TEXAS INTELL. PROP. L.J. (forthcoming, 2017) (“[T]he
use of damages heuristics may better serve public policy than one that requires patent owners to
substantiate every aspect of their claimed damages with rigorous proof.”); Cynthia M. Ho,
Drugged Out: How Cognitive Bias Hurts Drug Innovation, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 419, 426
(2014) (arguing that “pharmaceutical companies and some scholars have certain schemas that
have been reinforced by confirmation bias and propagated to others, such as policymakers,
through repetition.”).
34
Allan L. Shampine, The Role of Behavioral Economics in Antitrust Analysis, 27
ANTITRUST ABA 65, 67–70 (2012) (“[B]ehavioral economics has already entered antitrust analysis
(even if through the backdoor) and seems to be here to stay.”); see Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice
E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527, 1544 (2011) (The U.K. competition authority
reported that behavioral economics “can provide a superior account of competition, can lead to
more empirically based presumptions in antitrust’s legal standards, and can result in more
informed antitrust enforcement.”); see generally Currie, supra note 21.
35
See Bennett et al., supra note 26, at 129 (noting that while biases influence the market
process, they do not undermine the current system of analysis but rather a form of market failure).
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articulate more effective remedies.36 In other words, behavioral economics
can help judges better understand how to use the rule of reason to achieve
more dynamically efficient outcomes.
Through the lens of patents, Part II traces how the discretion given to
courts in applying the rule of reason has empowered them to treat patents
first with disdain, and then with veneration under antitrust law. This shift
parallels the ascendance of the importance of IP industries to the national
economy and the rise of neoclassical economics. It also explains how the
quest for dynamic efficiency has resulted in antitrust ennui, before
mounting three challenges to the belief that antitrust policy deference
toward patent owners promotes innovation. These challenges are that (1)
deference underestimates anticompetitive harm and undervalues the value
of gains from intervention, (2) courts are inconsistent about their
insecurities in regulating innovation through antitrust: they worry about
getting it wrong in exclusionary abuses and yet approach vertical restraints
and merger analysis with surprising confidence, and (3) patent deference is
suspect as a matter of patent policy.
Part III explains how Actavis’s requirement to scrutinize permissible
patent conduct through the rule of reason also creates the challenge of
developing a coherent and predictable framework of doing so. It argues that
Kimble empowers courts to incorporate insights from behavioral
economics. In doing so, courts can become more aware of their own
cognitive biases and those of the parties appearing before them, giving them
a chance to reach more dynamically efficient outcomes.
Part IV addresses the three criticisms against behavioral economics
most pertinent to the patent-antitrust intersection: (1) that irrational conduct
is irrelevant to antitrust analysis, (2) that behavioral economics fails to
provide predictability to antirust analysis, and (3) behavioral economics
experiments are anecdotal and fail to provide antitrust with a generalizable
organizing principle. Part IV then identifies four areas where behavioral
economics can help courts reach better outcomes: (1) analyzing
anticompetitive harm and procompetitive justifications, by contrasting the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit’s approaches in Microsoft and
Rambus, as well as the Supreme Court’s approaches in Actavis and Kimble,

36

Christopher R. Leslie, Can Antitrust Law Incorporate Insights from Behavioral
Economics?, 92 TEX. L. REV. 53, 61 (2014) (“A behavioral economics approach acknowledges
that deviations from rationality sometimes occur and it’s important to understand why in order to
interpret the evidence in a specific case.”).
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(2) empowering judges by enlarging the role of intent, with lessons drawn
from cases such as Aspen Skiing, McWane, and Intellectual Ventures, (3)
determining market power and lock-ins in aftermarkets, with lessons drawn
from Kodak and FRAND (fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory)
litigation, and (4) crafting smarter remedies by looking at the EU’s
Microsoft decision. The discussion draws on past, recent, and ongoing cases
to illustrate each area. Part V identifies areas for future research and
concludes.

II.

DOES THE “LIGHT OF REASON” WORK IN IP CASES?

At the patent-antitrust intersection, antitrust law aims to lower costs to
consumers by preempting or rectifying situations where a patentee has
created, enhanced, or maintained market power in a way that harms
vigorous rivalry among firms, whether through its licensing or litigation
practices, or through mergers and acquisitions.37 The jostling of interests
inevitably results in winners and losers, and courts need to distinguish
between losses that should be respected and those that should be corrected.
The unpredictability about the course of future competition makes it
difficult for courts applying antitrust law to do so.38
Courts attempt to make that judgment by the “light of reason,”39 also
known as the “rule of reason.”40 The rule of reason exonerates restraints on
competition with net procompetitive benefits while condemning restraints
that reduce consumer welfare.41 Defendants who restrict output or raise
prices must show offsetting efficiencies to exonerate themselves.42 In
37

HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 1.01-.03[A] (3d ed. 2017).
38
William E. Kovacic, Antitrust in High-Tech Industries: Improving the Federal Antitrust
Joint Venture, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1097, 1100 (2012) (“Even when expert decision makers
move at their fastest pace, traditional antitrust tribunals find it difficult to account for industry
changes that take place as a proceeding unfolds and to make accurate predictions about how
specific remedies might influence future competition.”).
39
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63–64 (1911) (“[B]y defining the
ulterior boundaries which could not be transgressed with impunity, to leave it to be determined by
the light of reason, guided by the principles of law and the duty to apply and enforce the public
policy embodied in the statute, in every given case whether any particular act or contract was
within the contemplation of the statute.”).
40
Id. at 66.
41
Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[R]eduction of
competition does not invoke the Sherman Act until it harms consumer welfare.”).
42
See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59–60 (2001).
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theory, judges weigh them against each other, much as Benjamin Franklin
used “prudential algebra” to weigh the pros and cons of his decisions
against each other.43 Surprisingly in practice, the balancing is almost never
done.44 Instead, courts rely on “hunch, faith, and intuition.”45
Courts dispose of allegations if the plaintiff failed to proffer
incriminating plausible evidence of anticompetitive harm, or if the
defendant introduced plausible exonerating evidence of procompetitive
benefits.46 Assessment under the rule of reason varies wildly “because
[economic] models can be built in many ways and their outcomes usually
depend more on the assumptions underlying the models than on the data
resulting from the fact-finding exercises.”47 The normative lens through
which a court views patents can be decisive, and several factors color that
lens.
First, a court’s risk assessment whether innovation is harmed is
necessarily subjective. Risk helps judges understand and cope with
uncertainties when adjudicating between competing narratives.
Accordingly, their evaluation of risk depends on the measure they choose
“with the obvious possibility that the choice may have been guided by a
preference for one outcome or another.”48 For instance, loss aversion is a
43

Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Joseph Priestley (1772), available at
http://www.procon.org/view.background-resource.php?resourceID=1474; see also Albert A. Foer,
On the Inefficiencies of Efficiency as the Single-minded Goal of Antitrust 39 (The American
Antitrust Institute, Working Paper No. 14-02, 2014), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/
sites/default/files/WorkingPaper14-02.pdf.
44
Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471,
2496 (2013) (“[A]ntitrust policy almost never balances except in cases where there is nothing to
put on one side of the scale or weighting differences are so great as to make the balancing solution
simple and obvious.”); Adriaan Ten Kate, Sr., Hundred Years Rule of Reason versus Rule of Law
9, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2795797 (noting that “out of
almost 300 rule-of-reason cases decided by federal courts in the U.S. during the last fifteen years
only six of them were resolved by a balancing test of pro- and anticompetitive effects.”).
45
Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1065 (1979)
(“[A]ntitrust enforcement along economic lines already incorporates large doses of hunch, faith,
and intuition.”); Kate, Sr., supra note 44, at 9 (“So my conclusion was that none of the cases was
effectively decided by the balancing test of the books.”).
46
See generally ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER,
ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY
(2d ed. 2008) (observing that courts do not actually balance procompetitive justifications against
anticompetitive effects).
47
Kate, Sr., supra note 44, at 6.
48
KAHNEMAN, supra note 19, at 141.
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“powerful conservative force” that informs the reluctance toward
intervention.49 Decision makers weigh future losses from their mistakes
more heavily than future gains if their intervention proves correct.50
Second, courts can subconsciously substitute the more difficult answer
with an easier one. When faced with the question whether innovation would
be harmed by allowing a patentee to impose grant-backs or exclusive
dealing requirements on licensees, courts must digest complex qualitative
and quantitative evidence. That intensive focus can drive them instead seek
to answer an easier and related question – “what do I think of patent
rights?”51 This affect heuristic, where the harder question is substituted for
an easier one, can then lead the decision maker to make implausibly high
correlation between the benefits and risks of intervention.52
Behavioral expert Daniel Kahneman notes that the affect heuristic
“simplifies our lives by creating a world that is much tidier than reality.
Good technologies have few costs in the imaginary world we inhabit, bad
technologies have no benefits, and all decisions are easy.”53 People
favorably disposed toward the patented technology see large benefits with
little risk when presented with arguments about the benefits of the
technologies, and their assessment of the risk changes even without any
relevant evidence of those risks.54
Similarly, those presented with arguments about low risks develop more
favorable view of its benefits. “In the real world, of course, we often face
painful tradeoffs between benefits and costs.”55 The “benefits and costs”
that Kahneman refers to is, of course, central to the antitrust rule of reason.
Yet, behavioral economics suggests that that balancing is missing, and
admissions like those by the D.C. Court of Appeals in Microsoft confirms
it. To find the missing piece of this doctrinal puzzle, “a page of history is
worth a volume of logic.”56

49

Id. at 305.
Id. at 302 (“The aversion to the failure of not reaching the goal is much stronger than the
desire to exceed.”).
51
See id. at 12 (describing how an executive being asked about whether to invest in Ford
stock substituting the question for whether he likes Ford cars).
52
Id. at 139.
53
Id. at 140.
54
Id. at 139.
55
Id. at 140.
56
N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
50
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A. Patents on a Pendulum
Antitrust law has oscillated between deference and suspicion of IP
rights.57 Nowhere is this seen more starkly than in its treatment of patents.58
Patents have been synonymous with American innovation since at least
1641 when the Massachusetts General Court conferred on Samuel Winslow
a ten-year exclusive right to a new process of making salt.59 After
America’s independence, patent rights were Constitutionally enshrined
along with Congress’s right to regulate commerce, establish post offices,
and declare war.60
Patents promote innovation by defining the scope of patented
technology and determining the circumstances where that scope has been
infringed.61 Patentees who can exclude non-licensed uses attributable to the
claimed technology can recoup the investment of time and effort in
developing and commercializing their inventions by exploiting their
claimed technology for a limited duration.62 Motivated by the promise of
profits, inventors develop new products and processes, and in so doing,
advance the state of the art.63 Without exclusive rights, valuable commercial
57
See Jeffrey I.D. Lewis & Maggie Wittlin, Entering the Innovation Twilight Zone: How
Patent and Antitrust Law Must Work Together, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 517, 523–39 (2015).
58
Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 468 (“Since the Sherman Act was passed, the federal
antitrust laws have cycled through extreme positions on the relationship between competition
policy and the patent system.”).
59
U.S. Const. art I., § 8, cl. 8.
60
America’s Founding Documents, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/
charters/constitution_transcript.html.
61
Robert Taylor, A Short History Lesson on Patent Policy, IP WATCHDOG (June 21, 2015),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/06/21/a-short-history-lesson-on-patent-policy/id=58833/
(“[E]nforceable patents provide the only viable way to justify the commitment of money, time and
effort needed to develop such a product.”); see also William E. Kovacic, Intellectual Property
Policy and Competition Policy, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 421, 424 (2011) (“Patent
protection can be essential to attract funds from capital markets, and facilitate licensing and joint
venture relationships.”).
62
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012); See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
480 (1974) (patent laws promote scientific progress “by offering a right of exclusion for a limited
period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and
development.”).
63
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004) (“The opportunity to charge monopoly prices––at least for a short period––is what attracts
‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic
growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be
found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.”).
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ideas and their embodiments are immediately copied, leading to the “market
failure of unfettered competition.”64
Former FTC Chair Bill Kovacic observed that patented technology
“present[s] acutely difficult variants of core antitrust issues and pose
analytical challenges that put extreme pressure at the joints of existing
antitrust rules.”65 That difficulty arises because the competitive effects of
curtailing patentee rights are unclear, and the arguments supporting
permissive or restrictive standards are inconclusive.66 In this context, a
judge’s biases will skew the outcome toward a theoretical model consistent
with the judge’s worldview and the evidence he or she considers
persuasive.67
The initial period of deference in the early 1900s rested on the
supposition that patent rights conferred “absolute freedom,” according to
the Supreme Court, “in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws”
because “[t]he very object of these laws is monopoly.”68 That period also
coincided with antitrust law being viewed as weak and used against labor
combinations rather than capital.69
From the 1930s, the Court was hostile toward patents and antitrust
hostility toward patents reached its height in 1970, when the U.S. Antitrust
Division issued its “nine no nos” of patent licenses would provoke an
antitrust challenge.70 The Court also saw patents as a worrisome
impediment to market competition, and gave a narrow interpretation of
patent law rights in favor of the antitrust laws.71 With the rise of
64
Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Taking Antitrust to Patent School: The Instance of Pay-For-Delay
Settlements, 58 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 159, 162 (2013).
65
Kovacic, supra note 38, at 1100.
66
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148, 151 (1989) (noting
that patent law creates an “exception” to the general rule of “free exploitation of ideas,” and it
engages in “the difficult business ‘of drawing a line between the things which are worth to the
public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.’”).
67
Marina Lao, Ideology Matters in the Antitrust Debate, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 649, 653 (2014)
68
Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902).
69
Daniel A. Crane, The Unrealized Congressional Vision for the FTC and Its Historic
Performance as a Law Enforcement Agency, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (2014), available at
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/CraneMAY-141.pdf.
70
Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Ass’t Atty. Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Justice, Patent and
Know-How License Agreements: Field of Use, Territorial, Price and Quantity Restrictions,
Remarks Before the Fourth New England Antitrust Conference 9 (Nov. 6, 1970).
71
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 18 (Oct. 2003), available at
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neoclassical economics in the late 1970s, the pendulum started swinging
toward patent deference and the scope of the patent test was resurrected to
shield patents from antitrust law.72 During the period of neoclassical
economics’ ascendance, there were three main factors that accentuated its
influence.
First, neoclassical economics was deeply concerned about the costs of
antitrust intervention.73 It should be said that neoclassical economics
deserves credit for steering enforcement away from populism and the
formalism of per se illegality, and toward a more nuanced and sophisticated
“effects-based” approach.74 Under the influence of neoclassical economics,
the presumption that patents bestowed market power was eliminated.75 The
antitrust plaintiff had to show that the antitrust defendant possessed
monopoly power in the relevant market and it was guilty of “willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or

http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 476–79 (“To be
sure, that approach made some sense in the early 1970s when . . . antitrust policy was
unreasonably hostile toward a wide variety of conduct, particularly vertical practices that we
regard today as economically harmless. The walled garden protected the patent from significant
antitrust overreaching. But today the tables have turned, and the overreaching is going in the other
direction.”).
72
WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAW (1973) (envisioning the patent as a
walled garden protecting everything within its scope); see also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (recognizing “that any adverse anticompetitive effects within the scope of the ‘444 patent could not be redressed by antitrust law.”),
abrogated by F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
73
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414–15
(2004).
74
See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Derek Moore, The Jevons Colloquium: Behavioral Economics
in Consumer Protection and Competition Law: The Future of Behavioral Economics in Antitrust
Jurisprudence, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 89, 89 (2010); James C. Cooper & William E.
Kovacic, Behavioral Economics and Its Meaning for Antitrust Agency Decision Making, 8 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 779, 779 (2012) (“Of all fields of regulation in the United States, antitrust law
relies most heavily on economics to inform the design and application of legal rules.”); Stefan
Buehler, Common Errors and Misunderstandings in Competition Law: An Economist’s View
(2012), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2206317 (“[I]t is now
widely accepted that, in many markets, the proper application of competition law requires a sound
understanding of applied microeconomics, with a particular emphasis on industrial organization
(IO) and applied econometrics.”); Edward D. Cavanagh, Antitrust Law and Economic Theory:
Finding A Balance, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 123, 127–28 (2013) (“[N]ow that economics and
econometrics are front and center in antitrust analysis, the first call, once parties have ‘lawyered
up,’ is to an expert economist.”).
75
Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45 (2006).
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development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident.”76 Critically for the patent-antitrust interface, “[t]o
safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will
not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of
anticompetitive conduct.”77
At the same time, jurisprudence informed by neoclassical economics
warned against false positives and the resulting chill to efficient conduct,78
and warned that applying the rule of reason can be tricky because “the
means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are
myriad,”79 and “inferences and the resulting false condemnations are
‘especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are
designed to protect.’”80 This could result in “arbitrary, inefficient, and
heavy-handed,” “[infringements on] rights to property and freedom to trade,
and suppresses individuality, initiative, and creativity.”81 The sensible
response is to do nothing, but if one must, one should tread gingerly since
“competitive and exclusionary conduct look alike.”82
Second, there was an effort by courts to rein in what was perceived to be
a plague of private antitrust litigation.83 Courts devised hurdles for antitrust
plaintiffs that made it easier for defendants to extinguish plaintiffs’ claims
at summary judgment, and at the later motion to dismiss stage. 84 The glacial

76

United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–571 (1966).
Verizon Commc’ns, 540 U.S. at 407.
78
Id. at 399–400.
79
Id. at 414–15 (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(en banc) (per curiam)).
80
Id. at 414.
81
Eleanor M. Fox, The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 917 (1987).
82
Frank H. Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for Exclusionary
Conduct?, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 345, 345 (2003).
83
See Gregory G. Wrobel et al., Judicial Applications of the Twombly/Iqbal Plausibility
Standard in Antitrust Cases, 26 ANTITRUST 8, 8 (2011) (finding that the courts had dismissed one
or more antitrust claims in 74 percent of 278 courts of appeals and district court rulings on
motions to dismiss in antitrust cases from the time Twombly was decided in 2007 until 2011).
84
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007); see also Cavanagh, supra note
74, at 127–28 (“Somewhat anomalously, the Court appears to solve the problem by advocating for
trial courts to dismiss these cases at the outset rather than go through a costly and lengthy trial and
run the risk of an erroneous outcome. The irony here, of course, is that on the one hand, the
Supreme Court encourages trial courts to admit economic evidence, and yet on the other, the
Court maintains that this type of evidence is too complicated for judges and juries to handle.”).
77
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pace of antitrust litigation and its expense conspire to make antitrust
enforcement ineffective in constraining even genuine anticompetitive acts.85
As influential as these first two factors might have been, the third
movement may have been the most powerful force in shaping the patentantitrust interface. Dynamic efficiency, or improving of social welfare
through technological advancement, is the Holy Grail of antitrust policy.86
Dynamic efficiency is responsible for most economic growth and consumer
welfare.87 Gains from rewarding innovation easily swamp static efficiency
from increased price competition.88 The opposite is true: stifling innovation
harms the economy more than stifling price competition. There is therefore
a belief that dynamic efficiency is best achieved through patent deference.89

B. Dynamic Efficiency via Patent Deference: A Call to Inaction?
In a dynamically efficient market, patentees are rewarded for their
investment risk and genius to the extent needed to spur innovation.90 Firms
who want to sustain more than competitive returns must develop
commercially valuable new products or processes. In this way, competition
leads to more efficient allocation of resources, encourages business to lower
costs, and promotes innovation.

85

See, e.g., David J. Teece & Mary Coleman, The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust Analysis
in High-Technology Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 801, 810 (1998) (arguing that scientific
progress may render the technology at issue obsolete).
86
Richard M. Brunell, Appropriability in Antitrust: How Much Is Enough?, 69 ANTITRUST
L.J. 1, 39 (2001) (noting that while static efficiency is “the traditional realm of neo-classical
economics,” “dynamic efficiency is far more important to economic welfare than allocative
efficiency drains the latter of much of its normative significance.”).
87
Bill Baer, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice
Remarks as Prepared for the Chatham House Conference on “Politicization of Competition Policy
–Myth or Reality?” (June 18, 2015) (“Economists have long recognized that these types of
innovations are responsible for the lion’s share of economic growth and advances in consumer
welfare.”).
88
ELEANOR M. FOX, THE EFFICIENCY PARADOX, HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT
THE MARK 77 (Roberts Pitofsky ed. 2008).
89
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (April 6, 1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm (“The intellectual property laws and antitrust laws share the
common purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare.”).
90
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 320 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(“[The Constitution] makes the public interest the primary concern in the patent system.”).
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Finding an optimal balance requires operationalizing price-innovation
trade-offs, a task that can be difficult because products and processes
change rapidly, and analysis of market definition, market power, and
competitive effects require an understanding of how these markets work.91
For instance, it is difficult to discern the factors that make firms dominant,
those that affect the durability of dominance, and those that could erode that
dominance.92
Efforts by both Democratic and Republican administrations over the
past few decades to incorporate dynamic efficiency into antitrust analysis
have resulted in an antitrust policy justifying high prices and limited access
without proof that patent deference delivers dynamic efficiency gains.93
This policy assumes “that maximizing the means maximizes the ends, that
greater intellectual property protection naturally leads to more invention
and thus to more progress.”94 Indeed, large drug, software, and consumer
electronics
companies
pushed
a
consistent
narrative
“that
patent . . . protection must be maximized because it represents the United
States’ last competitive advantage in global markets.”95
While courts have occasionally tried to articulate a balance between the
neoclassical paradigm for intervention, none have received widespread
application.96 Courts shifted from per se illegality toward a narrative that
patents confer property rights as the reward for effort, risk taking, and
ingenuity that should be respected by antitrust deference.97 The assumption

91

See, e.g., Kovacic, supra note 38, at 1100 (“[T]he exercise of defining relevant markets and
measuring market power can be especially difficult when an agency or court must assess the
relative weight of an incumbent technology as compared to that of a new technology that threatens
to displace it.”).
92
Cass, supra note 7, at 194.
93
Ronald A. Cass, Antitrust and High-tech: Regulatory Risks for Innovation and Competition,
14 ENGAGE 25, 30 (February 2013). See generally Thomas Cheng, Putting Innovation Incentives
Back in the Patent-Antitrust Interface, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 385 (2013).
94
Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Competition within Intellectual Property Regimes – The Instance of
Patent Rights Intellectual Property and Competition Law: New Frontiers, 5 (2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2084236.
95
Peritz, supra note 64, at 163.
96
See Michael A. Carrier, Refusals to License Intellectual Property After Trinko, 55 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1191, 1209 (2006) (noting inconsistent approaches and how that the trend “support[s]
lower court cases proffering absolute or near absolute immunity for refusals to license.”).
97
Peritz, supra note 64, at 161 (“What emerges is the powerful ideology that patents are the
just desserts of individual genius, the commercial reward for success in intellectual competition of
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is that monopoly power and charging of monopoly prices sustains the freemarket by attracting business acumen and risk taking that produces
innovation and economic growth.98 Firms with market power can better
fund and direct technological progress, and better guarantee dynamically
efficient outcomes.99 Conversely, competition lowers prices but also
dampens innovation.100
A court’s views to refusals to license sets the tone for all other forms of
licensing restrictions. The reason is that if patentees have an absolute right
not to deal with a licensee, then surely any condition, however onerous,
simply reflects the prerogative of patentees to dictate the terms of access.
The latitude courts give to that prerogative is also a function of how much it
subscribes to a linear relationship between stronger patent rights and
innovation. For instance, in Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., Judge Gorsuch
wrote,
Forcing firms to help one another would also risk reducing
the incentive both sides have to innovate, invest, and
expand—again results inconsistent with the goals of
antitrust. The monopolist might be deterred from investing,
innovating, or expanding (or even entering a market in the
first place) with the knowledge anything it creates it could
be forced to share; the smaller company might be deterred,
too, knowing it could just demand the right to piggyback on
its larger rival.”101
The narrative goes that it is therefore pro-competitive to allow patentees
to control access to its technology and require rivals to develop their own
competing technologies. This may well have influenced augmenting the
loss aversion bias discussed earlier. Without a proper basis for avoiding
harm to dynamic efficiency when courts intervene, antitrust sunk into

the highest order. In this light, any expansion of patent protection is praised as fuller protection of
perfectly natural rights.”).
98
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004).
99
See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 106
(George Allen & Unwin 1976) (1943).
100
Jennifer E. Sturiale, Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property as Merger Remedy: A
Decision-Theoretic Approach, 72 LA. L. REV. 605, 610 (2012).
101
731 F.3d 1064, 1073 (10th Cir. 2013).
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inertness.102 Only conduct that fell outside the patent scope was subject to
antitrust scrutiny, such as where it was used to create another monopoly in
an ancillary market,103 whether it was obtained by fraud, or asserted in sham
litigation.104
Behavioral economics suggests another reason for this inertness. Judges
and government officials expect their decisions to be scrutinized with
hindsight, and are driven to “extreme reluctance to take risks.”105 We tend to
blame decision makers for good decisions that turn out badly and miss signs
that seem obvious on hindsight.106 People tend to revise their current beliefs
in reconstructing former beliefs, without believing that they ever thought or
felt differently.107 As a result, hindsight bias leads observers to assess the
quality of a decision to curtail a patentee’s conduct based on whether the
outcome was good or not, rather than whether the process by which the
decision had been reached was sound.108 “The worse the consequence, the
greater the hindsight bias.”109 Technology is the nation’s greatest economic
engine, and courts adjudicating patent-antitrust cases may worry the impact
their decision might have on it.110
102

Maurice E. Stucke, Money, Is That What I Want?: Competition Policy and the Role of
Behavioral Economics, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 893 (2010); Cass, supra note 93, at 30
(“[M]uch of the analytical effort has been devoted to exposing reasons for doubting static
indications that markets are competitive rather than to identify the ways in which dynamic
changes will increase competition and correct perceived distortions.”).
103
See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666 (1944) (“The fact
that the patentee has the power to refuse a license does not enable him to enlarge the monopoly of
the patent by the expedient of attaching conditions to its use.”).
104
In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
105
KAHNEMAN, supra note 19, at 204.
106
See id. at 204–05.
107
See id. at 203 (“The tendency to revise the history of one’s beliefs in light of what actually
happened produces a robust cognitive illusion.”).
108
Cf. id. at 203–04.
109
Id. at 204. (citing the example of a July 2001 tip-off to the Central Intelligence Agency
about a possible threat from al-Qaeda attack on the United States that was escalated to National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice rather than President George W. Bush. After the 9/11 attack,
Ben Bradlee, editor of the Washington Post remarked “It seems to me elementary that if you’ve
got the story that’s going to dominate history you might as well go right to the president.” This
despite the fact that no one could have known the significance of that tip-off ex ante.)
110
See, e.g., ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION AND U.S PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: 2016 UPDATE 1
(2016), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/IPandtheUSEconomy
Sept2016.pdf (“Innovation and creative endeavors are indispensable elements that drive economic
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The main problem with attempting to achieve dynamic efficiency in the
antitrust context through patentee deference is that the benefits of doing
cannot be proven.111 Anyone seeking to quantify gains must discount the
future value of the invention to the present value and compare it against the
present cost imposed by the patentee’s conduct.112 Further, to determine
whether the outcome was dynamically efficient, courts must consider the
counterfactual and prospectively evaluate innovation incentives along the
current technological trajectory. What is the price of the counterfactual to an
anticompetitive exclusive dealing license? The exclusive nature of that
agreement eliminates a reference point for a competitive price. Yet
estimating anticompetitive effects rests on knowing that reference point.
Professor Herbert Hovenkamp used Pfizer’s blockbuster cholesterol
drug Lipitor to explain why antitrust intervention can be so tricky.113 When
Lipitor was brought to market, it was introduced at a high price but
consumers remained unharmed because earlier alternatives were still
available and may have even become cheaper because many of them
growth and sustain the competitive edge of the U.S. economy. The last century recorded
unprecedented improvements in the health, economic well-being, and overall quality of life for the
entire U.S. population as technological innovation in medicine and groundbreaking scientific
advances in many fields were realized.”).
111
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH
CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 33 (Comm. Print 1958) (“No economist,
on the basis of present knowledge, could possibly state with certainty that the patent system, as it
now operates, confers a net benefit or a net loss upon society.”); Peritz, supra note 64, at 162
(“Despite a century of scholarly work, too many academics, policy makers, and judges in the
United States still proceed as if maximizing patent rights serves to maximize innovation and, with
it, economic progress. These forces have propelled a maximalist view of patents and IPRs more
generally, despite the economic stalemate between patent protection and open competition as the
better engine for innovation and economic growth.”); Cass, supra note 7, at 197 (“[T]he problem
is not so much inattention to the possibility that there will be constraints on market leaders that are
not readily visible to the regulators, but rather the relative impenetrability of serious analysis of
what dynamic effects will be.”).
112
Peritz, supra note 64, at 164 (“[A]nalytical stalemate between the exclusionary rights of
patent protection and the free access of open competition, a stalemate because both contribute to
economic growth but to indeterminable degrees.”); Kate, Sr., supra note 44, at 6 (“When the proand anticompetitive effects of a conduct are conceived as the effects of the conduct on competition
– in my view, the only way to see it – one must be able to measure competition, something that
has proved beyond the capabilities of the competition community thus far.”); Id. at 7 (“To that end
assumptions must be made about the counterfactual conduct and about the way others react to the
change. Such assumptions are mostly arbitrary.”).
113
Herbert Hovenkamp, Consumer Welfare in Competition and Intellectual Property Law, 9
COMPETITION POL’Y IN’L 53, 60 (2013).

9 LIM (DO NOT DELETE)

144

4/10/2017 11:26 AM

BAYLOR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1

substituted their medication with Lipitor.114 Those who bought it placed at
least as much value as its price, and total output for cholesterol increased –
all efficient outcomes under antitrust law. The comparison is between
monopoly-priced Lipitor and none, not between competitively priced
Lipitor and the monopoly price. Rewarding is thus necessary, but how
much is too much?
There are still other complications. For instance, predicting innovative
activity depends on whether one believes innovation is cumulative or
sequential. If sequential, then control is preferred for the patentee success
shepherds his successor in turn.115 If cumulative, then the patentee’s claim
on exclusivity may impede innovation.116 Further, patents influence
innovative activity more in biopharma industries and much less so in the
tech industries.117 Claims over specific molecules and chemical
formulations enabled undertakings to exclude rivals and appropriate gains
to compensate for costly investments.118 In contrast, since innovation in
software, telecommunications, and microelectronics industries is
cumulative rather than discrete, the driving force in innovation is crosslicensing rather than exclusion.119
The shortlist is hardly exhaustive. Other factors include: (1) the optimal
duration of patents;120 (2) whether patent holdups dampen innovation more
114

Id.
See Gregory K. Leonard, Reflections on the Debates Surrounding Standard-Essential
Patents, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE (Aug. 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publishing/antitrust_source/aug15_leonard_7_21f.authcheckdam.pdf.
116
Id. (“[I]n a model of a single potential innovation, a patent system generally improves
social welfare, while in a model with cumulative innovations, a patent system can harm social
welfare.”).
117
JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, LAWYERS, AND
BUREAUCRATS PUT INNOVATION AT RISK (2008); See, e.g., Richard C. Levin, Appropriability,
R&D Spending, and Technological Performance, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1988) (A survey of
650 executives responsible for research and development in 130 industries shows they were most
effective in pharmaceutical and chemical industries.); See also Ho, supra note 33, at 426–427 (“It
is undisputed that patents are valuable and even essential to pharmaceutical companies, unlike
other areas of technology, such as software, where other issues, such as first-mover advantage, are
more important.”).
118
Ho, supra note 33, at 433.
119
Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions
and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working
Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.
120
See, e.g., Richard Gilbert and Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 THE
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 106, 106 (1990).
115
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than patent holdouts;121 (3) the proper scope of patent defenses and
exceptions;122 (4) whether innovation in a particular industry is at, or below,
its optimal level;123 and (5) whether the pace of innovation may continue
uninterrupted even with diminished patentee control as first-mover
advantage, trade secrets, or serendipity steps in to drive the innovation.124
Rather than confronting the known unknowns, neoclassical economics has
instead offered assumptions to buttress its preference for inertness.
Unfortunately, these assumptions rest on shaky ground.125
First, studies have undermined the theory that markets self-correct. They
indicate that the harm to competition can continue for more than a decade
after antitrust enforcement.126 For instance, network effects can lead to
dominant software firms becoming entrenched and allow the firms to
leverage into other product or geographic markets,127 drawing consumers
into the patentee’s orbit. 128 Further, neoclassical economics fails to account
121

See, e.g., Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro & Theresa Sullivan, Standard Setting,
Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 603-604 (2007).
122
See, e,g., Daryl Lim, Misconduct in Standard Setting: The Case for Patent Misuse, 51
IDEA 559, 573 (2011).
123
See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT 86 (2009) (“[S]ome industries rely more on patents than others to appropriate the
returns from innovation”).
124
F.M. Scherer, First Mover Advantages and Optimal Patent Protection 2 (Harvard Kennedy
Sch.
Faculty
Research
Working
Paper
Series,
RWP14-053),
available
at
https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=1191.
125
Benjamin R. Kern et al., Empirical Analysis of the Assessment of Innovation Effects in U.S.
Merger Cases, 16 J. OF INDUS., COMPETITION AND TRADE 2, 1 (2016), available at
https://www.unimarburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/50-2014_kerber.pdf
(“Despite
the consensus that competition policy should also protect innovation competition, it is still very
unclear whether and how competition authorities should take innovation effects into account.”).
126
See Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J.
ECON LIT. 43, 53 tbl. 9 (2006) (indicating that a number of cartels have lasted at least 40 years);
Ariel Ezrachi & David Gilo, Are Excessive Prices Really Self-Correcting?, 5 J. COMPETITION L.
& ECON. 249, 7 (2008) (supracompetitive prices only attract entry efforts if they signal that the
post-entry price would be high or that the incumbent firms have high costs, and even then entry
may not succeed in competing those prices down to competitive levels); Jonathan B. Baker,
Responding to Developments in Economics and the Courts: Entry in the Merger Guidelines, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 189, 194–95 (2003) (the price-depressing effects of entry may deter new
competition even if the merger raises prices above competitive levels).
127
See, e.g., Mark Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479 (1998).
128
See Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong
with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 14 (2015) (“To relax antitrust rules on the rationale
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for the innovation gains that denying the patentee’s claims might yield. For
instance, restricting the ability of patentees to pay potential generic
challengers may spur incumbents to develop new drugs to secure future
streams of income from newer patented technology.129 Indeed, rivals
“often . . . are in the best position to detect and prosecute many antitrust
violations early, before they cause significant consumer harm.”130
Second, neoclassical economics is selectively distrustful of courts’
abilities despite the fact that, as Michael Salinger noted, “reliable estimation
of the relative costs of false acquittals and false condemnations has proven
elusive.”131 Further, and rather inexplicably, judges interpreting antitrust law
seems to have no problems resolving allegations of competitive harm from
vertical restraints132 and mergers, which can also have efficiency
justifications,133 but yet distrust their own ability to determine whether
monopolistic conduct harms or benefits competition.134 This seems strange,
particularly in light of the fact that agencies have internal institutional

that one firm is enough for competition, in rapidly changing high-technology markets or
otherwise, would undermine innovation incentives under the guise of protecting them.”)
129
Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 512.
130
HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at 70.
131
Joshua Wright, Abandoning Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession: The Case for Evidence-Based
Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 301, 308 (2012) (citing Michael Salinger, Section 2 Symposium:
Michael Salinger on Framing the Debate, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (May 4, 2009),
http://truthonthemarket.com/2009/05/04/section-2-symposium-michael-salinger-on-framing-thedebate/.).
132
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. V. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 916–17 (2007) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (noting the difficulties courts face in evaluating market power and the net effect of
resale price maintenance).
133
Like dynamic efficiency, a prediction must be made about future efficiencies even before
the weighing takes place. The less cognizable the anticompetitive effects or efficiencies the more
likely the party bearing the burden of proof will lose. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE
COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1992, revised 1997), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) § 4. (“[P]rimary benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate such
efficiencies.”).
134
Baker, supra note 128, at 30. (“[T]he oddly selective conservative skepticism about the
competence of courts to make factual assessments appears to reflect a reflexive hostility to
exclusion cases rather than a sober response to an institutional problem with the courts.”)

9 LIM (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

INSIGHTS FROM BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS

4/10/2017 11:26 AM

147

checks and external judicial review,135 and courts can filter out baseless
claims and impose sanctions to deter other opportunistic actions.136
Third, as a matter of patent policy, patent rights do not reward effort per
se, but rather are simply a means of promoting technological progress
through the creation, disclosure, and dissemination of inventions.137 The
Supreme Court “has consistently held that the primary purpose of our patent
laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents, but is
‘to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.’”138 Patents are
neither rewards nor natural rights but incidental incentives, a private means
to a public end.139 They are incidental and subservient to the public’s
interest in the disclosure and dissemination of the technology.140 In a
dynamically efficient market, patentees are rewarded for their investment
risk and genius to the extent needed to spur innovation.141 Where the
opposing forces are equally ambiguous, this tilts the balance in favor of
access, not control.
Perhaps the starkest doctrinal embodiment of patent deference is the
“scope of the patent” approach, which extinguishes even a consideration of
any anticompetitive effects that may result.142 Under this view, a patent
right creates a “zone within which the patent holder may operate without
facing antitrust liability.”143 The problem is that just as antitrust formalism

135

Jonathan B. Baker, “Continuous” Regulatory Reform at the Federal Trade Commission,
49 ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 861 (1997) (describing the FTC’s Bureau of Economics “placing a costbenefit focus on every decision.”).
136
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §
2.2 (2010) (describing circumstances under which individual customer and competitor interests
regarding a merger among rivals would or would not be aligned with the public interest).
137
Peritz, supra note 64, at 162 (“Though the natural rights perspective is popular, it is the
constitutional rights view that dominates scholarly and policy debates in the U.S., the view that
patent rights are the private means to promote the public benefits of innovation to economic
growth.”).
138
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917).
139
Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 327–28 (1858) (“[T]he limited and temporary monopoly
granted to inventors was never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage; the benefit to the
public or community at large was another and doubtless the primary object in granting and
securing that monopoly.”).
140
See id. at 328.
141
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 320 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(“[The Constitution] makes the public interest the primary concern in the patent system.”).
142
FTC v. Actavis Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2225 (2013).
143
Id. at 2238 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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condemning the exercise of patent rights without considering their market
effects led to an ideological persecution of patentees,144 formalism animates
an abdication of judicial oversight.145 For instance, patent reverence
blinkers serious debate about whether incumbents have less incentive to
innovate because its new offerings will end up competing against its earlier
products.146
The FTC had warned that “[c]ompetition and patent policy are bound
together by the economics of innovation and an intricate web of legal rules
that seek to balance the scope and effect of each policy. Errors or systematic
biases in the interpretation or application of one policy’s rules can harm the
other policy’s effectiveness.”147 The advent of the Supreme Court’s Actavis
opinion would force every court adjudicating a patent-antirust issue to
confront that balance head-on.148

III. THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS, TWICE
In 2013, the Supreme Court in Actavis shattered the paradigm that
patents could immunize their owners from antitrust scrutiny. In subjecting
the exercise of patent rights to rule of reason analysis, the Court has created
a powerful impetus for courts to develop a more coherent framework to
adjudicate competing narratives at the patent-antitrust intersection. Two
years later, in Kimble, a patent case, the Court noted the central role of
judges in retooling antitrust analysis in light of new economic learning.
Kimble provides precedential backing for litigating parties and lower courts
to harness the evolutionary potential of the common law to fine-tune
144

See supra Part II.A.
Tim Wu, Intellectual Property Experimentalism By Way Of Competition Law,
COMPETITION
POL’Y
INT’L
(Dec.
20,
2013),
available
at
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/intellectual-property-experimentalism-by-way-of
-competition-law (“[T]he idea of selectively examining such rights ex poste threatens the certainty
and clarity prized by the system as a whole.”).
146
See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS, 620 (1962).
147
See Susan DeSanti et. al., FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1 (2003), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-com
petition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf.
148
Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 477 (“The Actavis decision suggests that the Supreme Court
may be finished with the walled garden approach reflected in the “scope of the patent” test.”); Id.
at 478 (“The ‘beyond the scope’ formulation is a relic of a bygone approach to antitrust . . . .”).
145
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antitrust analysis to recognize biases in predictive adjudication and finds
ways to better manage them.

A. Actavis: Toward a Unified Whole
Actavis involved a license between brand-name and generic-drug
manufacturers known as a “reverse payment,” so named because the flow of
money ran opposite from the typical exchange between licensee and
patentee when parties settle litigation.149 It was not ancillary to any kind of
joint production activity or technology sharing.150 The Court was concerned
that patents could be used as a pretext to divide the market and share the
proceeds of potentially invalid or non-infringed rights at the consumer’s
expense.151 Those patents might be weak or invalid, and the accused
infringer paid off to refrain from challenging the patent.152
More importantly, as Hovenkamp observed, the Court expunged the
notion that “[o]nce an area was deemed to be pervasively regulated,
antitrust law had no place.”153 Settlement agreements between patentees and
their would-be generic rivals were subject to antitrust scrutiny regardless of
whether they operated within the scope of the patent.154 Wherever the
exercise of patent rights might cause anticompetitive harm, “patent and
antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the ‘scope of the patent
monopoly’—and consequently antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by
a patent.”155
The Court asserted that there was “nothing novel” in what it did.156 It
merely harkened back to the approach it took prior to the era of antitrust

149

Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227.
See id. at 2229.
151
Id. at 2231; Wu, supra note 145, at 37 (“[S]ince such settlements are not uncommon, they
were, as a class, a defect in the system that should be fixed.”).
152
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–37.
153
Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 478.
154
Id. at 477 (“Naked market division, the practice at issue in Actavis, is not authorized by the
Patent Act, whether or not the agreement goes beyond the scope of the patent.”).
155
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231. Both the Actavis dissent and Eleventh Circuit defined patent
scope differently, which suggests the arbitrariness of that definition. The dissent defined scope as
the “precise terms of the grant define the limits of a patentee’s monopoly and the area in which the
patentee is freed from competition.” In contrast, both the Eleventh Circuit and the Actavis
majority defined “scope” using the patent’s expiration date.
156
Id. at 2233.
150
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immunity.157 In providing historical context to the “scope of the patent
approach,” Hovenkamp explained that:
The “beyond the scope” formulation actually originated
before the antitrust laws were passed, in nineteenth century
cases involving patent term extensions applied retroactively
to goods that had already been purchased. It was later used
to justify the judge-made first sale doctrine against
patentees who attempted to enforce patents rights in goods
that they had already sold.158
In explaining the first sale doctrine, The Court noted that:
Once the patent issues, it is strictly construed[.] [I]t cannot
be used to secure any monopoly beyond that contained in
the patent, the patentee’s control over the product when it
leaves his hands is sharply limited, and the patent
monopoly may not be used in disregard of the antitrust
laws.159
In criticizing the “scope of the patent” approach, Hovenkamp noted that
it created a “walled garden” that both shielded conduct that should have
been scrutinized and it unduly presumed harm where it was negligible or
nonexistent.160 Indeed, “[o]utside the patent law context such, an agreement
would be unlawful per se and could even be a criminal violation.”161

157

Id. at 2231–32.
Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 476
159
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964) (internal citations omitted).
160
Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 477 (“The ‘beyond the scope’ formulation has led courts to
two different ideas, both of which lack either conceptual or empirical support. One is that any
patent practice that reaches ‘beyond the scope’ of the patent is competitively harmful. The other is
that a patent practice that does not reach ‘beyond the scope’ of the patent is benign or
untouchable. As a matter of competition policy, the ‘beyond the scope’ formulation makes little
sense.”).
161
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason and the Scope of the Patent, 52 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 515, 518 (2015). See also Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, “Intel, Apple, Google,
Microsoft, and Facebook: Observations on Antitrust and the High-Tech Sector,” remarks
presented at the ABA Antitrust Section Fall Forum (Nov. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/intel-apple-google-microsoft-a
nd-facebook-observations-antitrust-and-high-tech-sector/101118fallforum.pdf (“[I]t would be
irresponsible of us to treat any transaction or conduct by an inventor as per se legal. That would be
like creating a super-immunity for patent holders.”).
158
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Previously the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft had
also debunked the notion that patents confer antitrust immunity when it
analogized IP to a baseball bat, and wrote owning one does not mean
escaping liability if it was used to cause tortious harm.162 The proper scope
of any property right is determined by looking at a constellation of relevant
rules. The Patent Act too supports the view that patent rights must be
considered in the context of antitrust law. Section 211 states that “Nothing
in this chapter shall be deemed to convey to any person immunity from civil
or criminal liability, or to create any defenses to actions, under any antitrust
law.”163 In scrutinizing the conduct of patentee in antitrust cases on par with
non-patent cases, Actavis therefore reached a well-support conclusion.
At the same time, courts applying the rule of reason to exploitation of
patent rights find their quest for precision in achieving dynamic efficiency
stymied by the challenge of operationalizing the rule. Professor Maurice
Stucke observed that the rule of reason employs “antitrust’s most vague and
open-ended principles, making prospective compliance with its
requirements exceedingly difficult.”164 While it is a challenge to weigh
those technological merits and costs along a non-linear and uncertain
trajectory,165 predictive judgments are “more qualitative and interpretive
than quantitative and technical.”166 This predisposes the outcome of cases to
the biases of the decision maker.167

162

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Microsoft’s primary
copyright argument borders upon the frivolous. The company claims an absolute and unfettered
right to use its intellectual property as it wishes: ‘[I]f intellectual property rights have been
lawfully acquired,’ it says, then ‘their subsequent exercise cannot give rise to antitrust liability.’
That is no more correct than the proposition that use of one’s personal property, such as a baseball
bat, cannot give rise to tort liability.”).
163
35 U.S.C. § 211 (2012).
164
Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1375, 1379 (2009).
165
Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Anticompetitive Innovation and the Quality of Invention,
27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 14 (2012); see also id. at 14–15 (“Identifying the ‘merits’ of a new
technology, however, constitutes the single most intractable aspect of the law governing both
anticompetitive innovation generally, and the D.C. Circuit’s balancing test specifically.”).
166
Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of Antitrust
Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 19 (2012).
167
Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 165 at 14 (“That problem, in turn, might result in courts
making decisions on the basis of their perceptions of the technical merits of the change in
question.”).
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In the three years since Actavis, courts have continued to struggle with
applying the rule of reason to reverse payments. The Court in Actavis had
pithily exhorted that “trial courts can structure antitrust litigation so as to
avoid, on one hand, the use of antitrust theories too abbreviated to permit
proper analysis, and on the other, consideration of every possible fact or
theory irrespective of the minimal light it may shed on the basic
question.”168 However, attorneys have bemoaned that “[t]he lack of a
concrete blueprint for evaluating whether potential reverse payments violate
the antitrust laws, coupled with minimal case law addressing causation and
damages, makes counseling in this area difficult in the extreme.”169
Fortunately, the Court had in fact provided the jurisprudential means for
making the development of that blueprint more tractable. However, bold
judicial spirits must be willing to step out from among the crowd of
timorous souls, roll up their sleeves, and engage litigants in order to figure
out how to do so.

B. Kimble: Beyond Tautology
In Kimble, the Supreme Court had to decide whether to overturn a
precedent prohibiting patentees from charging post-expiration royalties.170
It held that stare decisis in patent law was “superpowered.”171 For patent
cases that had anticompetitive significance, the outcome turned on the
“categorical principle” that royalties end when the patent term expires.172
Curiously, the Court noted that per se illegality “is simplicity itself to
apply,” in sharp contrast to the rule of reason which it noted “would make
the law less, not more, workable than it is now.173 Just two years before, in
Actavis, it had defended the rule of reason as being administratively

168

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013).
Brian Sodikoff, James J. Calder &Thomas Maas, Reverse Payments After Actavis,
Bloomberg BNA, 2 (Mar. 31, 2017). See also Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (“Although antitrust
attacks on reverse payment settlements have been brought for roughly 20 years, the law is still
developing—and is doing so at a frustratingly slow pace.”).
170
Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t. LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2405 (2015).
171
Id. at 2410.
172
Id. at 2413. Elsewhere, I discuss how uncoupling the competitive significance of the case
casts into doubt the Federal Circuit’s reformulation of the patent misuse doctrine based on
“anticompetitive effects.” See generally Daryl Lim, Patent Misuse and Antitrust: Rebirth or False
Dawn?, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299 (2014).
173
Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2411.
169
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feasible.174 In Part IV.B.2, this Article examines this schism through the
lens of behavioral economics.
The Court also noted that courts in antitrust cases had “exceptional lawshaping authority,” and are “relatively free to revise [their] legal analysis as
economic understanding evolves and . . . to reverse antitrust precedents that
misperceived a practice’s competitive consequences.”175 Congress had
intended by the Sherman Act’s general formulations to give courts the
power to identify or remedy anticompetitive conduct.176 Courts do so via
the common law.177 But what if the very economic theory that animates the
law is itself the cause of its inefficiency?
Neoclassical economics is touted for its simplicity, which works based
on the assumption that consumers and firms behave rationally. This is true
when decisions are made based on price and output.178 Dynamic efficiency
complicates measuring market power, assessing competitive effects, and
formulating remedies. Market shares and concentration levels are
misleading indicators for assessing the level of actual and potential
competition since that dominance can be wiped out by a new technological
platform, as when music streaming replaced CDs, and 4G replaced 3G
networks. The analysis requires courts to identify both rivals with the assets
and motive to exert competitive pressure on the patentee.
Neoclassical economics further “assumes perfect, symmetric access to
information and unqualified utility maximization by consumers.”179 Yet, it
provides no guidance on resolving competing narratives. For instance, in
Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit noted that “the economic consequences of
network effects and technological dynamism act to offset one another,
174

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013).
Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2412–13.
176
Herbert Hovenkamp, Brulotte’s Web, 17 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 3, 16 (2015),
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2626758.
177
Hovenkamp, supra note 176, at 16; Max Huffman, Commissioner Wright and Behavioral
Antitrust, 12 ANTITRUST SOURCE 10, 15 (2013) (“[T]he common-law, evidence-based process by
which antitrust develops is ideally suited to adjusting rules incrementally as new learning
emerges.”).
178
Henry C. Su, Thinking, Fast, Free, and Fashionable: Competition and Consumer
Protection in A Mobile Internet World, 27 ANTITRUST 82, 83 (2012) (“Economic models in which
consumers and firms are presumed to behave rationally work best when judgments and decisions
are based on price or output because they preserve the models’ simplicity and mathematical
rigor.”).
179
Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, The Empty Promise of Behavioral Antitrust, 37 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 1009, 1058 (2014).
175
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thereby making it difficult to formulate categorical antitrust rules absent a
particularized analysis of a given market.”180 Studies indicate that courts
reach arbitrary conclusions in technologically complex cases even with
expert testimony.181
Neoclassical economics thus produced a paradox where antitrust has, in
the pursuit of efficiency, closed off more promising paths to obtain
efficiency. Uncorrected, “over time, [neoclassical economics] threaten[s]
the legitimacy and success of the antitrust system as a whole . . . .”182 To
remain relevant, antitrust must adjust its rules by considering new
learning.183 As Kimble indicates, courts must drive that effort.
The first step to retooling the rule of reason at the patent-antitrust
interface is for courts to be cognizant both of their own cognitive biases and
those of the parties appearing before them. In his seminal work, Thinking,
Fast and Slow, Kahneman suggests that the human mind operates on two
tracks.184 System 1 works fast, is driven by habit, emotion, and intuition.
System 2 is deliberative, reflective, and rational.
System 1 thinking using heuristics helps us to structure complex choices
to avoid error and make better decisions.185 At the same time, heuristics can
powerfully mask what is obvious, dangerous, or absurd to the uncaptivated
mind. In Willful Blindness: Why We Ignore the Obvious at Our Peril,
Margaret Heffernan describes how, when faced with decisions involving
risk and uncertainty, we admit information validating our beliefs while
filtering out unsettling or non-task specific information.186As we receive
more information, we think we see more. The reality is the opposite.
The importance of biases and the tenancy of those who remain willfully
blind in light of contrary evidence should not be understated. For instance,

180

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50 (2001).
See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107
YALE L.J. 1535, 1539 (1998).
182
Baker, supra note 128, at 37.
183
Huffman, supra note 177, at 12; Kovacic, supra note 7, at 16 (“The intellectual history of
the U.S. competition policy system is marked by the continuous reformulation, refinement, and
adaptation of antitrust concepts in light of changes in economic and legal learning.”).
184
See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 19.
185
Gerd Gigerenzer & Wolfgang Gaissmaier, Heuristic Decision Making, ANNU. REV.
PSYCHOL. 62:451–82, 473 (2011), http://citrixweb.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/montez/upload/PaperOf
TheMonth/gigerenzer_gaissmaier_2011-1-2.pdf.
186
MARGARET HEFFERNAN, WILLFUL BLINDNESS: WHY WE IGNORE THE OBVIOUS AT OUR
PERIL, 1, 15 (2012) (“[E]verything outside that warm, safe circle is our blind spot.”).
181
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confirmation bias can blind decision makers to evidence that runs contrary
to their view of the world, as Galileo learnt a long time ago when he
attempted to debunk the Aristotelian geocentric view.187 In the patentantitrust context, Professor Mark Lemley revealed that “[t]he most vitriolic
attacks I have experienced in more than twenty years as a law professor
were directed at the most innocuous-seeming papers—papers that presented
data that revealed some uncomfortable facts about the status quo.”188 To
deal with the cognitive dissonance, Professor Lemley observed that “while
people will dispute, ignore, or shrug off policy arguments they disagree
with, they get really incensed when the data disagrees with them.”189 He
cites that an FTC report on the patent system in 2003 that recommended
further study on whether the patent system was working190 was “most
controversial” because “[i]f you like the status quo, the very last thing you
want, it seems, is to take a good hard look at whether it is working.”191
At the same time, since willful blindness is willed, we can also learn to
see better, not because our brain changes, but because we do. Post-Actavis
patent and antitrust attorneys who might have talked past each other are
compelled to present their arguments in a way that considers a worldview
more familiar to the other side. The next section explains what behavioral
economics can offer the patent-antitrust intersection.

IV. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS & PATENT-ANTITRUST LAW
This section begins by responding to the three objections relevant to
implementing behavioral economics in the context of the patent-antitrust
interface. Naturally, other objections exist, such as whether behavioral
economics amounts to paternalistic intervention when individuals and
companies should face the consequences of their decisions, for good or for
ill.192 These sorts of objections have been dealt with by others and are
outside the scope of this Article.193

187

Galileo Affair, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galileo_affair.
Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328, 1335 (2015).
189
Id. at 1335
190
Id. at 1336; Susan DeSanti et. al., FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 2 (Oct. 2003), available at
http:// www.ftc.gov/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-competition-patent-law-policy.
191
Lemley, supra note 188, at 1336.
192
See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?: THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN
PATERNALISM 5 (2014) (arguing that the argument nonintervention fails on several counts,
188
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Suffice to say that incorporating behavioral insights into antitrust law
can help decision makers make more accurate judgments and better
decisions. The goal is not to curtail individual freedom but to first recognize
that the freedom comes at a cost to both the decision maker and to society
when he or she makes bad choices, and the role of the law is to reduce those
negative externalities. This section then discusses four areas where
behavioral economics has great potential to improve analysis at the patentantitrust interface, and thereby improve the odds of courts reaching
dynamically efficient outcomes.

A. Answering the Critics
Three of the most potent criticisms against behavioral economics are
that: (1) market actors behave rationally;194 (2) behavioral economics give
rise to an infinite range of potential outcomes, some conflicting, making it
useless in predicting market behavior;195 (3) behavioral economics may
reveal idiosyncratic quirks but are not generalizable as a theory.196 In
contrast, “[s]tandard antitrust analysis already incorporates actual consumer
behavior into its analysis through concepts like market power, the
hypothetical monopolist test, and demand elasticities, which measure
consumer responsiveness (with or without cognitive biases) to changes in
prices and other market conditions.”197 Part IV.A refutes the three major
criticisms of behavioral economics. Part IV.B – E discusses how and why
neoclassical economics falls short as a means of navigating the patentantitrust intersection.

including the fact that it “would rule out many sensible practices that are no in effect, and it would
forbid many potentially beneficial reforms.”).
193
Id.
194
See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the TwentyFirst Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 514 (2007) (“While tossed against the rocks elsewhere,
within the quiet waters of antitrust these rational choice theories stand largely unchallenged.”).
195
Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins,
Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1040 (2012) (“[I]f
behavioral economics is to outperform price theory, its superiority must be proven by its greater
predictive power, not merely by the assertion that its underlying assumptions are more
‘realistic.’”).
196
Issacharoff, supra note 22, at 1734 (“The effects identified must be generalizable and not
limited to idiosyncratic situation-specific departures from rational model expectations . . . .”).
197
Wright & Stone II, supra note 24, at 1549.
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1. Irrationality and Willful Blindness
Courts guided by neoclassical economics can fall into the trap of
assuming that some forms of unilateral and conspiratorial conduct are
irrational and therefore must not have occurred.198 According to Professor
Avishalom Tor, “[t]he extensive use of neoclassical economics has
inculcated in the antitrust community a reliance on simplifying
assumptions,” in particular its “extensive reliance on the rationality
assumption.”199 These assumptions may derail the court from reaching the
right result. Justices on the Supreme Court has cautioned against precisely
this sort of blinkered approach. In response to economic evidence that
minimum resale price maintenance could be procompetitive and judged
under the rule of reason, Justice Breyer, in a forceful dissent joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg cautioned against a blinkered
reliance on economic theory in antitrust law:
Economic discussion, such as the studies the Court
relies upon, can help provide answers to these questions,
and in doing so, economics can, and should, inform
antitrust law. But antitrust law cannot, and should not,
precisely replicate economists’ (sometimes conflicting)
views. That is because law, unlike economics, is an
administrative system the effects of which depend upon the
content of rules and precedents only as they are applied by
judges and juries in courts and by lawyers advising their
clients. And that fact means that courts will often bring
their own administrative judgment to bear . . . .200
Far from detracting from the “administrative judgment” that courts
employ, behavioral economics empowers courts to make better judgements
by helping them understand real world behavior.201 The danger of willful
blindness may be seen in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., a 5-4 split decision, where the Court upheld the district court’s grant
198

Leslie, supra note 36, at 55 (“This refusal to appreciate the prevalence of so-called
irrational behavior in modern economies can distort fact-finding in individual cases.”).
199
Avishalmon Tor, Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 573, 606 (2014).
200
Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 914–15 (2007) (Breyer J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
201
Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1653, 1654 (1998) (noting that behavioral economics leads to “better predictions and
prescriptions about law based on improved accounts of how people actually behave.”).
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of summary judgment and found no genuine issues of material fact in
dispute on allegations of a predatory horizontal conspiracy among
competitors under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.202
Matsushita concerned Japanese television manufacturers that allegedly
engaged in collective, predatory pricing in the United States.203 The Court
found predatory pricing to be irrational because recoupment would require
conspirators to participate in a recoupment strategy resting on illegal pricefixing.204 When the scheme failed, the Court concluded that it never
existed.205 The Japanese manufacturers could not have conspired toward a
predatory pricing scheme because the American manufacturers were still in
the United States’ market twenty years later.206 The Court equated
irrationality with nonoccurrence, and cautioned that mistaken enforcement
of antitrust laws “are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct
the antitrust laws are designed to protect.”207 Yet, empirical evidence shows
that conspiracies like these do in fact occur.208
Lower courts have interpreted Mastushita to teach that predatory pricing
schemes are irrational and “unlikely to be attempted by rational
businessmen[,]”209 and as a result, they routinely granted summary
judgment to defendants.210 The rationality requirement in Matsushita
morphed from the threshold to survive summary judgment to a substantive
requirement in antitrust law.211 Soon, plaintiffs had to prove the rationality

202

475 U.S. 574, 574 (1986).
Id. at 577–78.
204
Id. at 591–92.
205
Id. at 592.
206
Id. (“The alleged conspiracy’s failure to achieve its ends in the two decades of its asserted
operation is strong evidence that the conspiracy does not in fact exist.”).
207
Id. at 594.
208
See Tor, supra note 199, at 595.
209
Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 528 (5th Cir. 1999).
210
See, e.g., Nat’l Parcel Servs., Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Logistics, Inc., 150 F.3d 970, 971 (8th Cir.
1998) (“NPS cannot show a dangerous probability of recoupment . . . . The district court properly
dismissed this claim.”); C.B. Trucking, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 66, 69 (D. Mass.
1996) (“[I]t is nevertheless economically implausible to conclude that Waste Management had a
‘dangerous probability’ of recouping its investment in below-cost prices . . . . Waste Management
is entitled to summary judgment . . . .”), aff’d 137 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 1998).
211
See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227
(1993) (incorporating requirement into predatory pricing); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons
Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 319 (2007) (incorporating requirement into predatory
bidding).
203
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of a monopolist’s alleged anticompetitive conduct generally.212 This has
created a formidable hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome.213
While Matsushita is not a patent-antitrust case, it is a stark reminder that
“courts may not appreciate the range of objectives that antitrust defendants
or firms generally pursue.”214 Matsushita “reverses the traditional inductive
process by which juries have always been instructed to proceed—from
empirical data to ultimate fact.”215
Professor Max Huffman has argued for a greater role for behavioral
economics and observes that “the clearest immediate benefit from
behavioral economics to antitrust thought is the development of intuitions
about individual conduct that may increase hospitality to evidentiary
demonstrations of real-world marketplace events.”216 Behavioral economics
cautions that antitrust defendants may not properly calculate the expected
value of their tactical decisions. Overconfident, risk seeking, or myopic
defendants may engage in predatory practices even if the expected value is
negative.217 And there are at least two other reasons why the rationality
requirement imposed by Matsushita may mislead a court as it seeks to
determine antitrust liability.

212

Clark v. Flow Measurement, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 519, 526 (D.S.C. 1996) (“The only way for
a plaintiff to show willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power is to provide evidence
that the business accused of violating antitrust laws had an economically viable scheme in
place.”).
213
Tor, supra note 199, at 583 (“[T]he Supreme Court made the legal bar for allegations of
illegal monopolization by predatory pricing under Section 2 of the Sherman Act nearly
insurmountable by relying on the rationality assumption.”).
214
Leslie, supra note 6, at 295.
215
Eugene Crew, The Chicago School Teaches the Supreme Court a Dubious Lesson,
ANTITRUST, 1, 11 (1986).
216
Huffman, supra note 177, at 16.
217
Avishalom Tor, Illustrating a Behaviorally Informed Approach to Antitrust Law: The Case
of Predatory Pricing, ANTITRUST 52, 54 (2003) (“Because loss aversion generates risk seeking for
losses, market participants will tend to take high-risk opportunities, such as predatory pricing
strategies, against the odds, in the hope of winning a negative expected value gamble and
eliminating a painful loss.”). See also KAHNEMAN, supra note 19, at 87 (“The confidence that
individuals have in their beliefs depends mostly on the quality of the story they can tell about what
they see, even if they see little. We often fail to allow for the possibility that evidence that should
be critical to our judgment is missing—what we see is all there is. Furthermore, our associative
system tends to settle on a coherent pattern of activation and suppresses doubt and ambiguity.”).
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First, the defendant may seek to eliminate a rival and credibly deter its
potential entry in the long-term.218 Once a defendant establishes a credible
threat of exclusion, it can then recoup its losses through durable,
monopolistic control of the market.219 One motivation for this is that firms
prioritize market share gains over profits.220 Matsushita assumed Japanese
firms make their exporting and pricing decisions based solely on profit
expectations.221 Cultural norms come into play. Japanese firms execute their
nation’s industrial policy,222 making the spillover benefits to the domestic
economy that accrued from successfully excluding rivals rational even if
short-term profits may suffer. The Japanese firms in Matsushita could
therefore have taken a longer time horizon in deciding their pricing
strategy.223 Their strategy would help them achieve economies of scale in
production and cumulative experience that accrued to them as first movers.
Patentees are also susceptible to overconfidence bias and attempt to deter
rivals.
Second, defendants may wish to develop a reputation for toughness. The
availability bias – where rivals overestimate the sustainability of the
patentee’s low-cost campaigns because they were under the influence of
particularly aggressive strategies recently – makes this rationale for
218

See, e.g., Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88
GEO. L.J. 2239, 2297–98 (2000) (describing a cable company that expended only one million
dollars to defeat a new entry, and in doing so avoided losses of $16.5 million per year).
219
Leslie, supra note 6, at 299 (“Predatory pricing threats are more likely to be credible if
similar threats have actually been carried out in the past.”).
220
Leslie, supra note 6, at 294; see also JAMES C. ABEGGLEN & GEORGE STALK, Jr., KAISHA,
THE JAPANESE CORPORATION 276–77 (1985) (noting that Japanese corporations “constantly
search for growth . . . [with] a preoccupation with market share and competitive position in
contrast to the Western firm’s return on investment objective. Leading market share will provide
high margins in time.”).
221
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582–83 n. 6 (1986).
222
Oversight and Authorization of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Econ. and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong. 27, 27 (1989) (statement of Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., former Counselor for Japan Affairs to
the Secretary of Commerce) (noting that “[T]he thrust of Japanese industrial activity in virtually
all areas is to build up initially on the home market, keeping the home market closed, and then to
go into international markets, usually utilizing some kind of dumping or predatory pricing method
and very often the terms of that competition involve collusion which under U.S. law would be
illegal”).
223
Steven F. Benz, Note, Below-Cost Sales and the Buying of Market Share, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 695, 714 (1990) (noting that “[s]trategic considerations [make] the long-term buying of
market share economically feasible”).
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predatory pricing particularly effective.224 For instance, a patentee that is a
patent privateer may have a different profit-motive for innovating than a
publicly-funded research institution, such as Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation (WARF). 225
Behavioral economics teaches that courts should look at empirical
evidence instead of relying on assumptions, such as the aphorism that
stronger patent rights promotes innovation or that a seemingly irrational
patentee poses no antitrust threat.226 The rule of reason informed by
behavioral economics simply takes the facts as a given and focuses on why
they take place and the effect a defendant’s conduct has on competitive
structure rather than dismissing the conduct because it is episodic and
irrational. 227
Developing the thought further, an effects-based rule of reason analysis
should not be tangled in extraneous considerations of how an irrational
patentee should behave in every circumstance, but simply whether it
satisfied the elements of causing harm in the exercise of its market power in
the case at issue.228 When theory and data clash it does not mean that the
theory is wrong. It simply shows that the data shows that the theory needs

224

Avishalom Tor & William J. Rinner, Behavioral Antitrust: A New Approach to the Rule of
Reason After Leegin, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 805, 825–26 (“The relevance of availability-based
judgments for manufacturers’ estimates is apparent: insofar as their information provides a biased
sample of price-cutting events and their vivid and salient negative effects, manufacturers are likely
to excessively recall these events and thus overestimate both the probability of price-cutting and
the frequency of its harmful manifestations.”).
225
Daryl Lim, Unilateral Conduct and Standards, in JORGE L CONTRERAS ED., THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW, VOL. 1 – ANTITRUST AND
PATENTS (forthcoming 2017) (“The reputation of PAEs are enhanced, not harmed, by a reputation
of toughness in corralling settlements.”).
226
See Walter G. Park & Douglas C. Lippoldt, Technology Transfer and the Economic
Implications of the Strengthening of Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries (2008),
available at http://fs2.american.edu/wgp/www/park_lippoldt08.pdf (“[S]tronger levels of patent
protection are positively and significantly associated with inflows of high-tech products . . . . and
expenditure on R&D.”).
227
Leslie, supra note 36, at 63 (arguing that “in many ways the entire litigation process is
designed to address the deviations from normalcy—the man who robs a bank, the woman who
kills her spouse, and the firm that monopolizes a market. The fact that, on average, people may not
engage in deviant behavior in no way suggests that the legal process should be blind to the
deviations that do occur and punish them when they violate the law.”).
228
Leslie, supra note 36, at 64 (“When evaluating the plausibility of antitrust claims,
defendants are neither data points nor opportunities to reject some researcher’s null hypothesis.
Policy requires a theory; fact-finding does not.”).
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to be refined. As a practical matter, judges should, at a minimum, allow
discovery when confronted with facially irrational conduct in summary
judgment motions as was the case in Matsushita, with motions to dismiss,
in formulating substantive rules for antitrust violations. 229

2. Predictability
Critics argue behavioral economics combines biases and gives rise to
“an infinite range of potential market outcomes.”230 Further, it “cannot
provide a coherent alternative model of human behavior capable of
generating testable predictions and policy conclusions in a wide range of
areas.”231 Instead, behavioral economics “is the decidedly prosaic function
of explaining phenomena after the fact.”232 This makes behavioral
economics inadequate as a theory to guide legal analysis.233 In contrast,
neoclassical economics “focuses on what is likely to be the overriding
consideration for most firms in most markets: profit. That focus enables it
to model and predict future behavior in a way that antitrust analysis can
readily and effectively deploy.”234 There are several responses to this.
First, behavioral economics teaches that biases are systematic and can
be modeled.235 This empowers legal analysis to better predict human
reactions to market stimuli.236 How it does so, however, may surprise some
229

See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007).
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of
Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1427 (1999) (“behavioral research presents too
many conflicting and overlapping biases to make confident overall predictions about consumer
perceptions”); Wright, supra note 17, at 2257. (“Indeterminate predictions, to be sure, are at least
one cause of the reluctance to adopt behavioral economics in the law.”).
231
Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1765, 1777 (1998).
232
Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 165, at 1051.
233
Wright & Stone II, supra note 24, at 1527.
234
Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 165, at 1063.
235
RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF
ECONOMIC LIFE 5 (1992) (“[M]any of the departures from rational choice that have been observed
are systematic— the errors tend to be in the same direction. If most individuals tend to err in the
same direction, then a theory which assumes that they are rational also makes mistakes in
predicting their behavior.”).
236
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and
Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 739 (2000) (noting that it “promise[s] to predict
people’s reactions to law more accurately than either law and economics or traditional legal
scholarship”).
230
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readers. Studies on clinical predictions show subjective assessments of
trained professions were less accurate than statistical predictions made by
combining variables according to a rule.237 That rule can be informed by
simple statistics. Princeton economist Orley Ashenfelter devised a means of
predicting the future value of Bordeaux wine based on information
available in the year they were made.238 Like antitrust intervention, wine
takes time to produce results, and like technology that is heterogeneous, the
price of wine from the same product vary dramatically across different
vintages.
It was remarkable enough that Ashenfelter’s formula provided more
accurate forecasts, decades into the future, than the current prices of young
wines.239 Even more remarkable are the implications: experts may be
inferior to algorithms, and contrary to neoclassical economics’ assumption,
the market clearing price may not fully capture the value of the technology
sold or licensed, or its lack of value thereof.240 Experts may have performed
worse because, according to Kahneman, they “try to be clever, think outside
the box, and consider complex combinations of features in making their
predictions.”241 He notes that “[c]omplexity may work in the odd case, but
more often than not it reduces validity. Simple combinations of features are
better.”242 Another reason is that “humans are incorrigibly inconsistent in
making summary judgments of complex information. When asked to
evaluate the same information twice, they frequently give different
answers.”243
The Ashenfelter study indicates that formulas achieve greater predictive
accuracy in “low-validity environments.”244 What kind of algorithm would
237

Paul Meehl, “Causes and Effects of My Disturbing Little Book,” 50 Journal of Personality
Assessment 370 (1986), cited in KAHNEMAN, supra note 19, at 222 (noting that sixty percent of
the studies showed significantly better accuracy for the algorithms, while the others scored a tie).
See also KAHNEMAN, supra note 19, at 222 (noting that “a tie is tantamount to a win for the
statistical rules, which are normally much less expensive to use than expert judgment.”).
238
KAHNEMAN, supra note 19, at 223.
239
Id. at 224.
240
Id.
241
Id..
242
Id.
243
Id. at 224–25 (“Experienced radiologists who evaluate chest X-rays as ‘normal’ or
‘abnormal’ contradict themselves 20% of the time when they see the same picture on separate
occasions.”).
244
Id. at 225–26 (“[T]he experts who evaluate the quality of immature wine to predict its
future have a source of information that almost certainly makes things worse rather than better:
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a court use? Dominant statistical practice assigns weights to different
predictors, thus employing what is known as multiple regression.245
However, it has been shown that one can do as well by selecting valid
scores for predicting the outcome and adjusting those values to make them
comparable.246 Simplified formulas proved just as accurate in predicting as
the multiple regression formula, and even superior because they would be
unaffected by sampling errors.247 Kahneman noted that “[t]he surprising
success of equal-weighting schemes has an important practical implication:
it is possible to develop useful algorithms without any prior statistical
research. Simple equally weighted formulas based on existing statistics or
on common sense are often very good predictors of significant
outcomes.”248 For instance, the Apgar test systematically assesses infants
according to five variables and three scores.249 These gave delivery room
staff the consistent standards they needed to identify infants at risk and
reduce infant mortality. It is still used in every delivery room today.250
Does this mean that patent-antitrust cases should be adjudicated by
algorithms rather than experts? The answer seems to be “yes,” but only as a
guide, much like a fitness app might track steps and chart health goals,
because it would be difficult to image the legal community at present being
comfortable with a software program deciding their legal rights, however
logical the appeal of that solution might be. The Agpar test also faced
they can taste the wine. In addition, of course, even if they have a good understanding of the
effects of the weather on wine quality, they will not be able to maintain the consistency of a
formula.”).
245
Id. at 225.
246
Id. at 226 (citing Robyn M. Dawes, The Robust Beauty of Improper Linear Models in
Decision Making 34 American Psychologist 571–82 (1979)).
247
See id. at 225 (citing Jason Dana and Robyn M. Dawes, “The Superiority of Simple
Alternatives to Regression for Social Science Predictions,” Journal of Educational and Behavioral
Statistics 29(3), 317–31 (2004)).
248
Id. at 226. See also ATUL GAWANDE, A CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS
RIGHT (Metropolitan: Holt 2009) (providing other examples of the virtues of checklists and simple
rules.).
249
The variables were heart rate respiration, reflex, muscle tone, and color, and the score (0,
1, or 2, depending on the robustness of each sign. A total score of 8 or above was likely to in good
shape. One with a score of 4 or below was probably in need of immediate intervention. See
Virginia Apgar, A Proposal for a New Method of Evaluation of the Newborn Infant, 32 CURRENT
RESEARCHES IN ANESTHESIA AND ANALGESIA 4, 260–61(1953); Mieczyslaw Finster and
Margaret Wood, The Apgar Score Has Survived the Test of Time, 102 ANESTHESIOLOGY 855
(2005).
250
Id. at 227.
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hostility and skepticism from clinical psychologists about the notion that
algorithms could trump skill in making predications.251 That hostility was
understandable given that hunches they experienced during therapy sessions
were confirmed, which in turn validates their clinical skill. The problem,
Kahneman noted was:
[T]hat the correct judgments involve short-term predictions
in the context of the therapeutic interview, a skill in which
therapists may have years of practice. The tasks at which
they fail typically require long-term predictions about the
patient’s future. These are much more difficult, even the
best formulas do only modestly well, and they are also
tasks that the clinicians have never had the opportunity to
learn properly—they would have to wait years for
feedback, instead receiving the instantaneous feedback of
the clinical session. However, the line between what
clinicians can do well and what they cannot do at all well is
not obvious, and certainly not obvious to them. They know
they are skilled, but they don’t necessarily know the
boundaries of their skill.252
The same might be said of judges and government officials who have to
make similar short-term predictions in the context of adjudicating
competing narratives of innovation. They fail to make accurate long-term
predictions about the future because these are tasks that they never had to
learn properly. Like the therapists, they know they are skilled but fail to
recognize the limits of that skill in determining that non-intervention is the
better option.
Kahneman ends his anecdote about the Agpar test on a note that gives
hope to the future of patent-antitrust adjudication. He expects that “hostility
to algorithms will probably soften as their role in everyday life continues to
expand. Looking for books or music we might enjoy, we appreciate
recommendations generated by software.”253 He cited as examples
recommendations by websites on music and books based on past
purchasing choices, credit limits that are set of us without human
intervention, guidelines such as the ratio between good and bad cholesterol

251

Id.
Id. at 228.
253
Id. at 229.
252
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levels and the price a professional football team should pay for rookie
players.254 It is past time that legal analysis taps into algorithmic decision
making tools, when we use it in so many other more mundane aspects of
our lives. At the patent-antitrust interface, the impetus for this should be
particularly power since the human decision makers must routinely wade
into the uncertain waters each time they adjudicate a case.
How would such an algorithm look like? Kahneman suggests selecting a
few traits that are prerequisites for success of antitrust intervention that are
as independent from each other as possible. He recommends no more than
six, and that those traits may be assessed reliably by asking factual
questions. Next, a list of questions should be drawn up for each trait and
scored between 1-5, with each representing a degree from “very weak” to
“very strong.” Then stick with the outcome, even if there is another one that
the decision maker might prefer. How might an algorithm look like in the
patent-antitrust context? It should be user-friendly, and attuned to the
conduct at the issue and the innovation structure of the industry in question.
The specifics of such an algorithm are well beyond the boundaries of this
Article and would be more properly undertaken by an appropriate multidisciplinary group.
Second, behavioral economics need not be predictive for it to be
valuable in antitrust analysis.255 It explains the context and market effects of
patentee conduct by providing a normative framework explaining how
decisions are made.256 At the same time with experience, the predictive
decision making process under the rule of reason can be improved.257 The
difference between a chess master who walk past a street game and
announces, “white mates in three,” on the one hand, and rest of us who can
easily detect anger in the first word of a telephone call is that our abilities
are more commonly possessed, but they no less remarkable.258 Experience

254

Id.
See Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and
Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 502–503 (2002).
256
See Daryl Lim, Living with Monsanto, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 559, 623–24.
257
KAHNEMAN, supra note 19, at 35 (“As you become skilled in a task, its demand for energy
diminishes. Studies of the brain have shown that the pattern of activity associated with an action
changes as skill increases, with fewer brain regions involved. Talent has similar effects. Highly
intelligent individuals need less effort to solve the same problems, as indicated by both pupil size
and brain activity”). See id. at 11 (noting that “[T]he accurate intuitions of experts are better
explained by the effects of prolonged practice than by heuristics.”).
258
Id. at 11.
255
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has simply enabled the chess master to recognize familiar elements and act
appropriately and immediately. The chess master’s memory contains a
reparatory of guiding principles acquires through a lifetime, offering
instantaneous and approximately accurate solutions to chess-related
inquiries. To acquire those skills, Kahneman noted that the chess master
needed “a regular environment, an adequate opportunity to practice, and
rapid and unequivocal feedback about the correctness of thoughts and
actions.”259
The common law acts as the collective memory for courts adjudicating
patent-antitrust disputes. The percolation of an issue such as the antitrust
legality of reverse payments in patent disputes through the judicial
hierarchy (from district courts to appeals courts to the Supreme Court) and
across circuits courts provides precisely that environment. The feedback
across circuits and up and down the hierarchy serves another important
purpose. Feedback must be independent and the errors uncorrelated to
maximize the useful information derived from multiple sources.260
Dr. Gary Klein, a research psychologist, has advanced the idea of using
such “premortem” to overcome group think when the group has almost
come to a decision but has yet to commit itself.261 The group should
imagine the outcome opposite to the one the group is tending toward, which
in the legal context would mean the dissenting view, if any.262 One study
showed that bias was mitigated when judges were encouraged to consider
competing hypotheses.263 Tribunals with a plurality of decision makers,
such as FTC Commissioners, Courts of Appeals, and the Supreme Court
can decorrelate spurious errors by separating judgements on an issue before
any discussion. Over time, tests formulated under a rule of reason that is
informed by both neoclassical and behavioral economics can better balance
competing narratives at the patent-antitrust intersection.
The common law provides a good habitant to develop more predictable
application of behavioral insights because the federal appellate courts
enable issues to percolate. Hence the Supreme Court in Actavis directed the
lower courts to develop the rule of reason framework for reverse
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Id. at 416.
Id. at 84.
261
Id. at 264.
262
Id. at 84.
263
Id. at 264 (citing J. Edward Russo and Paul J. H. Schoemaker, Managing Overconfidence,
33 SLOAN MGMT. R. (1992)).
260
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payments.264 And in Kimble, the Court reminded courts of their
“exceptional authority” to shape antitrust law and reconsider precedent
based on new economic learning.265
Third, there will inevitably be a degree of uncertainty in any decision
involving the future because the world is unpredictable. All antitrust cases
except mergers are decided “after the fact.”266 Neoclassical economics adds
nothing to the ability of courts to prognosticate innovation trajectories and
forecast dynamically efficient outcomes. Instead, its mantra is “sit still and
do nothing.” Further, it was the neoclassical movement that rallied courts to
abandon predictable rules of per se illegality in favor of the amorphous rule
of reason.267
Precision has come at a price for the rule of reason, which “provides
little predictability to market participants. It subjects litigants and trial
courts to the purgatory of ‘sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming’
discovery.”268 The undertaking requires courts to marry fact-finding with
econometrics.269 To operationalize the rule of reason, countervailing effects
must be assessed on complicated qualitative and quantitative dimensions.270

264

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2233, 2238 (2013).
Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2405 (2015).
266
Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 783
(9th Cir. 2015) (“requir[ing] not merely an appraisal of the immediate impact of the merger upon
competition, but a prediction of its impact upon competitive conditions in the future; this is what
is meant when it is said that the amended § 7 was intended to arrest anticompetitive tendencies in
their incipiency”) (citation omitted).
267
See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 4–5 (1997) (“[T]his Court has reconsidered its
decisions construing the Sherman Act where, as here, the theoretical underpinnings of those
decisions are called into serious question.”) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145
(1968) (holding that maximum resale price maintenance is not illegal per se)); Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007) (overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (holding that maximum resale price maintenance is
not illegal per se)); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47–49 (overruling United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (holding that vertical nonprice restrictions
are not illegal per se)).
268
Stucke, supra note 164, at 1384.
269
Kate, Sr., supra note 44, at 5 (“Few people are fully aware of the difficulties involved in
estimating the magnitude of effects. People tend to think that it is just a matter of some fact
finding and hiring in an econometrician.”).
270
Kate, Sr. supra note 44, at 4 (“[There has been a] loss of predictability and [a] concomitant
loss of legal certainty for the business community, which result[ed] from the rule-of-reason
approach. . . . I have serious doubts about the capability of our dismal science to estimate them
265
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The rule of reason’s standard of “reasonableness” requires value judgments
to give meaning to it.271 Judges must choose between alternatives, each with
its own set of trade-offs.272 In patent-antitrust cases, “a judge or scholar’s
instincts about whether to second-guess ‘innovations’ in antitrust and IP
cases depends largely on the individual’s normative views about the
importance of the interests on the other side.”273
One may ask if behavioral economics is predictably pro-enforcement
because it challenges the self-correcting nature of markets and the
assumption that intervention is likely to be more harmful than helpful. The
answer is “no.” Good choice architecture aims to promote competition
rather than squelch it. By providing information about risks, or using
default rules, competition should be enhanced, not reduced.274 Behavioral
economics simply aims to provide a more reliable basis for decisionmaking within the existing legal framework. Professor Andreas Heinemann
summed up that “as a methodological tool, it is neutral with respect to the
outcome.”275 However, since neoclassical antitrust’s pursuit of dynamic
efficiency seems to have led to a pro-patentee tilt, recalibrating so more
cases survive preliminary motions to dismiss or summary judgment motions
to consider the facts more carefully would be a welcome change.

3. Generalizability
Critics argue the empirical results of behavioral economics have never
made it out of the laboratory setting and are not ready for the “prime time”
of real world decision making.276 In contrast, neoclassical economics’
simplifying assumptions offers “an organizing principle” so policymakers

with any degree of precision. In my view, antitrust economists suggesting the opposite are
insufficiently realistic.”).
271
V.K. Rajah, Op-Ed, Interpreting the Constitution, THE STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), May
30, 2015, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/interpreting-the-constitution (“[T]he process
involves a degree of judicial lawmaking, occurring in the interstices of the written law . . . .”).
272
Id. (Courts may be well-placed to reach a decision, and “so long as the judge is guided by
proper textual considerations, properly articulated, the interpretation that he reaches will be a
legitimate one, even though another judge might legitimately reach a different conclusion.”.)
273
Stacey Dogan, The Role of Design Choice in Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law, 15
COLO. TECH. L.J. 27, 30 (2016).
274
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 192, at 113.
275
Heinemann, supra note 11, at 30.
276
Wright & Stone II, supra note 24, at 1548 (“Behavioral Antitrust Is Not Ready for Prime
Time.”).
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can act analytically rather than merely descriptively.277 At the same time,
those same critics concede that “[a]lthough modern economic theory and
econometrics yield powerful insights into the market effects of complex
business phenomena, much of the information necessary to resolve certain
antitrust questions remains unknown and unavailable.”278
First, there is a large and growing body of evidence from the field
documenting consumer behavioral biases of in real markets.279 If people are
required to buckle their seatbelts while driving, the rule will increase net
welfare in spite of population heterogeneity.280 Second, the value of
behavioral economics does not lie in prognosticating irrational conduct
generally, but in sensitizing courts to anticompetitive effects that result
from deviations from rationality when they occur. By questioning the
unconscious, behavioral economics empowers parties to help courts better
decipher how dynamic markets work.281 Third, the court is only concerned
about the allegations of anticompetitive harm perpetrated by the defendant
before it and determines if it meets the standard of proof, not to generalize
the conduct into a theory.282 Given the heterogeneity of innovation
incentives, imposing a one-size-fits all solution will reduce net welfare.283
In such instances, default rules for specific types of industries or licensing
arrangements could work better.
Critics also overlook the fact that the law lags theory. Neoclassical
economics became dominant “more by drip than by torrent.”284 Even critics
of behavioral economics have conceded that “[b]ehavioral economics is
likely to adapt and change over time, make important discoveries, and focus
277

Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 165, at 1060.
Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 165, at 1062.
279
Valerie P. Hans, The Jury’s Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 196 (1989) (“Sociologists and other scholars have demonstrated
numerous instances in which corporations violate principles of rationality.”); Michael D. Grubb,
Behavioral Consumers in Industrial Organization, 47 REVIEW OF INDUS. ORG. 247, 253 (2015).
280
SUNSTEIN, supra note 192, at 97.
281
See infra Part IV.C–E.
282
Leslie, supra note 36, at 64 (“The Judiciary’s function is not to fit the defendant’s conduct
into a larger theoretical construct. . . . Policy requires a theory; fact-finding does not.”).
283
SUNSTEIN, supra note 192, at 97.
284
Huffman, supra note 177, at 12. See also Wright, supra note 17, at 2224 (“the evolution of
the Sherman Antitrust Act has been a tale of measured integration of neoclassical microeconomic
analysis into the vague contours of the Sherman Act”); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of
Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 926 (1979) (describing the incremental adoption of
modern antitrust economics into the law in terms).
278
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on new problems.”285 Like other theories in search of practical applications,
behavioral economics will experience a similar lag. It took some time
before the theory of relativity was adapted and applied to Global
Positioning Systems for smartphones. However, that did not warrant
rejecting it in favor of staying with Newtonian physics.286 The vitality of
antitrust law ultimately depends on those it was created by and for – the
judges themselves. If antitrust law is to be successfully retooled, judges
must develop it through trial and error.
Even at this relatively nascent stage of development, behavioral
economics can already help judges recognize evidence in determining
whether an anticompetitive agreement or monopolistic conduct is
plausible.287 It also helps sidestep the elusive balancing process under the
rule of reason by developing burden shifting and proxies of anticompetitive
harm or procompetitive benefit to reach more dynamically efficient
outcomes. These ideas are explored below.

B. Anticompetitive Harm and Procompetitive Justifications
Antitrust plaintiffs must prove that the practice harmed the competitive
process and thereby harmed consumers rather than competitors alone.288
The defendant must then offer a procompetitive justification for its act.289
Some courts frame this as “a nonpretextual claim that its conduct is indeed
a form of competition on the merits because it involves, for example,
greater efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal.”290 The plaintiff must then
rebut it or show that the anticompetitive harm outweighs it.291 This section
shows how behavioral economics helps explain the reasoning and outcomes
of key cases at the patent-antirust intersection, and distills lessons from the
discussion.
285

Wright & Stone II, supra note 24, at 1549.
Richard W. Pogge, Real-World Relativity: The GPS Navigation System,
http://www.astronomy.ohio-state.edu/~pogge/Ast162/Unit5/gps.html.
287
In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 1999) (“‘[P]lus factors’ refers
to ‘the additional facts or factors required to be proved as a prerequisite to finding that parallel
action amounts to a conspiracy’ . . . . The plus factors may include, and often do, evidence
demonstrating that the defendants: (1) acted contrary to their economic interests, and (2) were
motivated to enter into a price fixing conspiracy.”).
288
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl–O–Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
289
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58–59 (2011).
290
Id. at 59.
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Id.
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1. Microsoft and Rambus
Microsoft and Rambus illustrate how the D.C. Circuit took diametrically
opposite approaches in two landmark cases to achieve dynamic efficiency
in the face of uncertain outcomes. In Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit expressed
concern over how Microsoft’s tying practice might exclude nascent
competition from web-based programs running Java that would allow app
developers to bypass Windows.292 The viability of Java as a rival was
uncertain and unreliable, and evidence-based answers were unavailable.
The court turned the clock back to make the judgment call based on market
concentration, competitive market structures, and the acceptable level of
appropriation through closed systems compared with open-source
systems.293
The D.C. Circuit bypassed the usual proxies of higher prices and lower
output, and was prepared to “infer causation when exclusionary conduct is
aimed at producers of nascent competitive technologies,” because “neither
plaintiffs nor the court can confidently reconstruct a product’s hypothetical
technological development in a world absent the defendant’s exclusionary
conduct.”294 It found that Microsoft should not be given “free reign to
squash nascent, albeit unproven, competitors at will—particularly in
industries marked by rapid technological advance and frequent paradigm
shifts.”295 Instead, it should be “made to suffer the uncertain consequences
of its own undesirable conduct.”296 The lynchpin of liability was
“undesirable” conduct that hurt nascent rivals without any obvious
consumer benefit, such as a demonstrably better product. Microsoft rejected
imposing a requirement that the antitrust plaintiff must prove a
counterfactual, calling such a test “edentulous.” and noting that “it would be
inimical to the purpose of the Sherman Act to allow monopolists free reign
to squash nascent, albeit unproven, competitors at will.”297
Professor Stacey Dogan noted that “the Microsoft court gives a nod to
concerns about judicial meddling with innovation, [but] it views those
concerns as cautionary rather than immobilizing.”298 Microsoft may have
292

Id. at 79.
Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 165, at 36–37.
294
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 79.
295
Id.
296
Id.
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Id.
298
Dogan, supra note 273, at 127.
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recognized, as she did, that “non-interference has its own costs and risks,
both in a static sense (by immunizing conduct with net social costs) and
through its impact on incentives and norms.”299 Here, the court first
recognized that it had to reach an outcome that promoted innovation in the
face of uncertainty.300 However, instead of opting for inaction as counseled
by neoclassical economics, the court decided to shift the burden of the
uncertainty onto the defendant to provide the information to resolve the
issue.301
Shifting the burden makes sense because the patentee has both the
information and incentive to be as helpful as possible.302 The patentee is in
a superior position to produce documentation of procompetitive
justifications and, without the burden shift, antitrust law would require a
proponent to prove a negative. It is settled law that “fairness dictates that a
litigant ought not have the burden of proof with respect to facts particularly
within the knowledge of the opposing party.”303 A practice tip is to find out
which technologies or enterprises target firm leaders identify as threats to
the firm or its industry and what leaders in other firms indicate possessing
the potential to replace the product or service at issue. Courts “should take
those concerns and hopes seriously; these often will turn out to be more
instructive than carefully crafted extrapolations from industry trends and
published forecasts.”304
Microsoft should be contrasted with Rambus, decided by the same court
seven years later.305 The FTC investigated Rambus for breaching disclosure
obligations under standard-setting organization (SSO) policies when it
failed to disclose its interest in patents related to the standardization efforts
and stated that “disclosures it did make were misleading.”306 According to
the D.C. Circuit, there was no “cognizable violation of the Sherman Act
when a lawful monopolist’s deceit has the effect of raising prices (without
299

Id. at 129.
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58–59.
301
Id. at 59.
302
Lim, supra note 172, at 367.
303
Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Christenson, 809 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015); see also United
States v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n.5 (1957) (“The ordinary
rule, based on considerations of fairness, does not place the burden upon a litigant of establishing
facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his adversary.”).
304
Cass, supra note 7, at 198.
305
Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
306
Id. at 461.
300
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an effect on competitive structure) . . . .”307 The FTC must have concluded
that JEDEC (the SSO) would not have adopted a proprietary technology at
all.308 The result in Rambus was a triumph for the defendant – not on the
strength of its evidence but by a court that deprived itself of the opportunity
to consider evidence from the party best able to provide it, leading the court
to find a lack of anticompetitive harm because it forced upon the plaintiff an
insurmountable task of proving a counterfactual.
Rambus “has been criticized, both on the basis of its antitrust analysis
and as a matter of public policy, inasmuch as it failed to sanction conduct
that was widely condemned as deceptive.”309 As Professor Jay Kesan and
Carol Hayes note, the court’s reading “is potentially broad enough to
restrict or eliminate the application of antitrust law in cases involving
patents that are part of a standard.”310 Further, consistent with the
neoclassical view, the outcome reflected institutional suspicions of the
ability of courts to police ambushes – the hallmark of neoclassical
antitrust.311 Rambus also ignored Microsoft’s rejection of a “but-for”
standard in favor of acts that “reasonably appear capable of making a
significant contribution to . . . . monopoly . . . .”312
If the FTC had provided insufficient evidence that JEDEC would have
adopted an alternative standard, the D.C. Circuit should have rejected the
issue on an evidentiary basis.313 Instead, it adopted a causation standard that
effectively eliminates an antitrust response to deception even when the IP
policies are clear.314 It also did not seem to matter to the D.C. Circuit, who
took the reins of monopoly power or how they obtained that power. The
point was that firms remained free to extract monopoly rents once
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Id. at 466.
Id.
309
Jorge L. Contreras, Implementing Procedural Safeguards for the Development of
Bioinformatics Interoperability Standards, 39 N. KY. L. REV. 87, 105 (2012).
310
Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, and
Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 269 (2014).
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Id.
312
Ankur Kapoor, What Is the Standard of Causation of Monopoly?, ANTITRUST, Summer
2009, at 38 (citation omitted).
313
M. Sean Royall, et al., Deterring “Patent Ambush” in Standard Setting: Lessons from
Rambus and Qualcomm, ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, at 35–36.
314
Id. at 35.
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standardization took place.315 Deception made no difference to the market,
since implementers and consumers had to pay one patentee or another. It is
not higher royalties per se, but the manner through which they achieve their
ability to extort the industry that warrants scrutiny.316 Efforts to obscure
“information desired by consumers for the purpose of determining whether
a particular purchase is cost justified is likely enough to disrupt the proper
functioning of the price-setting mechanism of the market that it may be
condemned” under antitrust law.317
Microsoft and Rambus illustrate how courts can choose to use burden
shifting as a proxy to reach more dynamically efficient outcomes, and what
happens when they do not. The proxy functions like a heuristic to cut
through the complex knowns and known unknowns. In the discussion that
follows, Actavis and Kimble illustrate how heuristics and biases affect the
Supreme Court in its antirust analysis as well.

2. Actavis and Kimble Revisited
Actavis held that large and unjustified reverse payments may violate
antitrust laws under a rule of reason analysis.318 A large and unexplained
payment tied to a delay in entry from the date of settlement could be an
improper agreement to delay entry and split the proceeds of an otherwise
unjustified agreement to maintain the patent monopoly in a situation where
there is an invalid, or arguably invalid, patent.319 The settlement’s
anticompetitive effects must be weighed against any legitimate
justifications including “avoided litigation costs or fair value for
services . . . .”320 Indeed, “there is not the same concern that a patentee is
using its monopoly profits to avoid the risk of patent invalidation or a
finding of noninfringement.”321
The Court pointed out that “the payment (if otherwise unexplained)
likely seeks to prevent the risk of competition. And, as we have said, that

315
Jonathan Hillel, Standards x Patents ÷ Antitrust = ∞: The Inadequacy of Antitrust to
Address Patent Ambush, DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 17 § 56 (2010).
316
Lim, supra note 122, at 582–83.
317
FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 461–62 (1986).
318
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013).
319
See id.
320
Id.
321
Id.
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consequence constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm.”322 The quick
look approach in antitrust law shifts the burden to the defendant on proof of
an agreement. This amounts to the same thing, with the plaintiff only
showing that that there was a large payment that accompanied the
agreement, which would shift the burden to the defendants to explain the
reasons for that payment.323 The Court thus adopts “large and unjustified
payment” as a proxy in place of proof of a horizontal market division
agreement.
This should not be a failure of the rule of reason analysis. Rather, it is a
triumph of heuristics. A full-blown balancing exercise would have been
tremendously complicated, analytically vague, and subjective. By placing
the burden on the parties best placed to discharge it, the framework mirrors
Microsoft in achieving both precision and efficiency.324 The Court’s
approach places the burden on the defendant to explain itself where the
conduct is more likely than not to be harmful.
Post-Actavis, lower courts have developed this heuristic to provide some
guidance on the outer boundaries of antitrust liability. First, patentees who
lose on contentions on patent validity, infringement, or inequitable conduct,
may face “serious and dramatic repercussions in the subsequent resolution
of the antitrust challenge to the reverse payment settlement.”325 Second,
non-cash considerations may amount to reverse payments, including
patentees agreeing not to launch an authorized generic product during the
first-filer’s exclusivity period.326 Third, even if a private plaintiff can prove

322

Id.
Id. (“Where a reverse payment reflects traditional settlement considerations, such as
avoided litigation costs or fair value for services, there is not the same concern that a patentee is
using its monopoly profits to avoid the risk of patent invalidation or a finding of
noninfringement.”).
324
Lim, supra note 256, at 565 (“Where appropriate, the court may truncate the inquiry by
shifting the burden onto the patentee to explain its conduct. This will incentivize the party best
placed to provide the information to the court to do so.”).
325
Brian Sodikoff, James J. Calder, Thomas Maas, Reverse Payments After Actavis,
Bloomberg BNA (Mar. 31, 2017), referring to In re Modafinil Litigation, 06-cv-1797, 06-cv1833, 06-cv-2768, 08-cv-2141 (E.D. Pa.); 153475 (3d Cir.).
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King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 403–406 (3d
Cir. 2015). In re Lidoderm Antitrust Litig., 14-md-2521 (N.D. Cal.); In re Opana ER
(Oxymorphone Hydrochloride) Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2580, Case No. 14-cv-10150 (N.D. Ill)
(including Value Drug Co. v. Endo Health Solutions Inc., 14-cv-2630 (N.D. Cal.); In re Lamictal
Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 12-cv-995 (D.N.J.); In re Loestrin 24 Antitrust Litig., 13-md2472 (D.R.I.).
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that a reverse payment is anticompetitive, it may still need to prove facts in
a “but for world” scenario, such as generic launch, regulatory approval, or
other factors.327 However, as noted in Part III. A., these data points fall
short of giving attorneys the certainty they need to properly counsel their
clients.
Kimble illustrates not a heuristic, but a bias with respect to the rule of
reason. Two years before Kimble, the FTC in Actavis had argued that the
quick look approach should be applied since these agreements essentially
amounted to collusion to divide up the market between the brand and
generic.328 The Actavis Court disagreed, holding that the legality of a
reverse payment must be judged by the rule of reason, which it
characterized as “feasible administratively.”329
Two years later in Kimble, the same Court rejected the rule of reason as
a tool for assessing the competitive merits of post expiration royalties,
dismissing it as an “‘elaborate inquiry’ produc[ing] notoriously high
litigation costs and unpredictable results.”330 The majority instead preferred
the per se rule of illegality which “is simplicity itself to apply.”331 Notably,
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, who dissented in both Actavis
and Kimble, criticized the rule of reason as “unruly” in Actavis332 while
embracing it in Kimble – a remarkable change of heart.333
How does one explain this shift? Behavioral economics provides the
answer—substitution bias. The Justices had a result in mind and sought the
reasoning that best allowed them to support that outcome. The Justices
sought information consistent with their preexisting schemas while

327

See United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 & Participating Emp’rs Health &
Welfare Fund v. Crosby Tugs, LLC (In re Actos End-Payor Antitrust Litig.), 848 F.3d 89, 93–94
(2d Cir. 2017); Am. Sales Co., LLC v. Astrazeneca LP (In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust
Litig.), 845 F.3d 470, 476 (1st Cir. 2017); In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., No. 15-12730-DJC, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 952 at *12–13 (D. Mass. Jan. 4, 2017); In re Actos End Payor Antitrust Litig.,
No. 13-CV-9244 (RA), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127748 at *57–58 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 22, 2015); In re
Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 390 (D. Mass. 2013).
328
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
329
Id. at 2236 (“An antitrust defendant may show in the antitrust proceeding that legitimate
justifications are present, thereby explaining the presence of the challenged term and showing the
lawfulness of that term under the rule of reason.”).
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Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2411 (2015) (citation omitted).
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Id.
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Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2245.
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Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2416.
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rejecting disconfirming evidence. We tend to revise the remembered history
of our beliefs. As Kahneman explains:
Many psychologists have studied what happens when
people change their minds. Choosing a topic on which
minds are not completely made up—say, the death
penalty—the experimenter carefully measures people’s
attitudes. Next, the participants see or hear a persuasive pro
or con message. Then the experimenter measures people’s
attitudes again; they usually are closer to the persuasive
message they were exposed to. Finally, the participants
report the opinion they held beforehand. This task turns out
to be surprisingly difficult. Asked to reconstruct their
former beliefs, people retrieve their current ones instead—
an instance of substitution—and many cannot believe that
they ever felt differently.
Your inability to reconstruct past beliefs will inevitably
cause you to underestimate the extent to which you were
surprised by past events.334
Bias can also occur within the same case. The majority in Kimble
adhered to stare decisis despite criticism that the patent conferred no market
power post-expiration and that since the licensee paid the aggregate of
whatever it valued over the license term, how it was structured did not
affect the aggregate amount paid.335 The majority held that stare decisis in
patent law was “superpowered.”336 Because it framed the cases as being
rooted in patent policy, the basis for that determination was based on the
“categorical principle” that royalties end when the patent term expires and
not on the competitive significance of post expiration royalties.337 In
contrast, the Kimble dissent framed the facts as “purporting to apply [the
Patent Act], [but are] actually based on policy concerns.”338 Despite there
being no antitrust question before the Court, the dissent maintained that the

334

KAHNEMAN, supra note 19, at 202.
Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409 (noting that stare decisis rests on the idea “that it is usually
‘more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right’”) (citation
omitted).
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Id. at 2410.
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Id. at 2405.
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guiding precedent was “an antitrust decision masquerading as a patent
case”339 premised on a “debunked” economic theory.340 It also noted that
stare decisis does not require the retention of a “baseless and damaging
precedent.”341 This schism too may be explained by confirmation bias
where two sides see the same issue but frame it differently.342
The schisms over the rule of reason in Actavis and Kimble, as well as
the burden shifting in the face of unpredictable innovation trajectories in
Microsoft and Rambus, illustrate how the same court in two different cases
can take markedly different positions, debunking the predictability avowed
by neoclassical theorists. These cases illustrate the importance of placing
greater weight on articulating why exactly a court thinks that its intervention
or abstention would further dynamic efficiency.

3. A Word on Procompetitive Justifications
In unifying antitrust and patent policy, Actavis forces courts to confront
the question of what it takes for patentees to innovate in applying the rule of
reason. When it comes to demanding exclusive rights to secure returns on
innovation, pharmaceutical companies arguably have the best case on their
side.343 Yet Professor Cynthia Ho observed that drug companies distort
conventional wisdom that every drug requires a billion dollars to develop,
“when the reality is that most new drugs cost a fraction of that price.”344
Similarly, drug companies tout their innovativeness “when in reality, most
of the ‘new’ drugs they produce are modest improvements that often have
little therapeutic value.”345 These cognitive biases reinforce and perpetuate

339

Id.
Id. at 2415.
341
Id.
342
KAHNEMAN, supra note 19, at 413 (“[T]he framing of the individual’s decision—Thaler
and Sunstein call it choice architecture—has a huge effect on the outcome.”).
343
Ho, supra note 33, at 426–27 (“It is undisputed that patents are valuable and even essential
to pharmaceutical companies, unlike other areas of technology, such as software, where other
issues, such as first-mover advantage, are more important.”).
344
Id. at 426 (“Admittedly, even a fraction of $1 billion is still quite expensive, but the
exaggerated number has important implications for how policymakers and scholars consider ways
that patent law should be tailored to promote innovation.”).
345
Id. (“Although small innovation is better than none at all, the assumption that most new
drugs are highly innovative also implicates patent law and policy.”).
340
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the belief that ironclad levels of patent protection are required to promote
innovation.346
What is of concern is that the beliefs may be based on flawed evidence.
For instance, Professor Ho traces the billion-dollar figure to a press release
that was repeatedly circulated and even “presented as an undisputed fact” in
the Wall Street Journal and Forbes magazine.347 Similarly, a report by the
National Institute for Health Care Management concluded that “only 15%
of new drugs were highly innovative and the percentage of new drugs that
were highly innovative was decreasing over time, with companies mostly
developing drugs that were incremental modifications to existing drugs.”348
As such, the empirical basis for any procompetitive innovation-based
arguments must be carefully examined and appropriately “de-biased” before
being accepted.

C. Intent: Valuing the Conscious
Intent is already relevant in antitrust analysis.349 A non-IP case that
illustrates this principle is Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp.350 The Aspen ski area consisted of four mountain areas.351 The
defendant owned three of those areas, and the plaintiff owned the fourth.352
They cooperated for years in issuing a joint, multiple-day, all-area ski
ticket.353 When the defendant repeatedly failed to negotiate an increased
share of the proceeds, it canceled the joint ticket.354 The plaintiff was
concerned that skiers would bypass its mountain without some joint

346

Id. at 429 (“[C]urrent patent law and policy, in conjunction with existing cognitive biases,
contribute to duplication in some areas and inadequate development in others.”).
347
Id. at 453.
348
Id. at 459.
349
See, e.g., Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“[K]nowledge of
intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.”); United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (requiring “the willful acquisition or maintenance of
[monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident”); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S.
447, 456 (1993) (attempted monopolization requires predatory or exclusionary conduct with a
specific intent to monopolize).
350
472 U.S. 585 (1985).
351
Id. at 587–88.
352
Id. at 589.
353
Id. at 590–91.
354
Id. at 592–93.
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offering and offered to buy the defendant’s tickets at retail price.355 The
defendant refused.356
The Supreme Court held that “[the defendant] elected to forgo these
short-run benefits because it was more interested in reducing
competition . . . over the long run by harming its smaller competitor.”357 In
finding for the plaintiff, the Court held that this refusal to sell, even at its
own retail price, “suggest[ed] a calculation that its future monopoly retail
price would be higher.”358
A commitment to improving the understanding of how defendants
decide means a prominent role for an inquiry into the intent their allegedly
anticompetitive acts. Intent provides context and an anchor to unify the
rules around an intelligible norm. This is consistent with Professor Maurice
Stucke’s argument that “antitrust law should blend rules with general
principles to enhance predictability for ordinary cases while preserving
flexibility for novel restraints.”359 Such a “framework would reduce the cost
of error under the Court’s per se rule, without imposing the high litigation
costs and risk of false positives and negatives under the rule of reason.”360

1. A Bigger Role for Intent
The current mantra is generally that uncharitable intent toward rivals,
even a wish to “destroy” them, is legal under antitrust law.361 Courts reason
that “[c]ompetition is a ruthless process”362 and antitrust laws are not
“designed to be a guide to good manners.”363 Their concern is that if “intent
to harm a competitor alone [becomes] the marker of antitrust liability, the
law would risk retarding consumer welfare by deterring vigorous
competition—and wind up punishing only the guileless who haven’t figured

355

Id. at 593–94 & n.14.
Id. at 593.
357
Id. at 608.
358
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409
(2004) (discussing Aspen, 472 U.S. 585).
359
Stucke, supra note 164, at 1479.
360
Reeves & Stucke, supra note 34, at 1582.
361
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
362
Ball Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1338 (7th Cir. 1986).
363
Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1078 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Olympia
Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986).
356
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out not to write such things down despite (no doubt) the instructions they
received in countless ‘antitrust compliance’ seminars.”364
Other courts look more charitably on the role of intent. For instance, in
McWane, Inc. v. FTC, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found
that “clear anticompetitive intent . . . supports the inference that it harmed
competition.”365 It observed that “[e]vidence of intent is highly probative
‘not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the
court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.’”366 When approaching
licensing restraints,
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of
the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought
to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a
good intention will save an otherwise objectionable
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent
may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.367
For a monopolization charge, and in particular “whether the challenged
conduct
is
fairly
characterized
as
‘exclusionary’
or
‘anticompetitive’ . . . there is agreement on the proposition that ‘no
monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing.’”368 On the facts,
McWane found “particularly powerful” evidence of anticompetitive
intent.369 The defendant’s exclusive dealing scheme was a “deliberate plan”
to prevent its rival from reaching the critical market mass necessary to

364

Novell, Inc., 731 F.3d at 1078.
783 F.3d 814, 840 (11th Cir. 2015).
366
Id. (citation omitted); see also Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59 (“Evidence of the intent behind
the conduct of a monopolist is relevant only to the extent it helps us understand the likely effect of
the monopolist’s conduct.”).
367
Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 316 (2d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
368
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 (1985).
369
McWane, Inc., 783 F.3d at 840.
365
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invest and receive a profitable return.370 This allowed the court to infer that
“the witnessed price behavior was the (intended) result” even if “[n]ot all of
the evidence adduced in this case uniformly points against [the
defendant].”371
Similarly in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Financial Corp.,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland found that the patentee’s
intent was highly relevant in answering the antitrust question.372 At a
motion to dismiss stage, the court believed that the patentee could have
intentionally acquired “a massive patent portfolio,” encompassing 3,500
patents related to the financial services industry “so that it could hold up
banks that have substantially invested in those existing product designs.”373
It “start[s] from widely adopted and existing technology” and “us[es] the
designs of existing products as . . . custom-built patent portfolios . . . .”374
Thus, the patentee capitalized on “substantial sunk investments” their
alleged infringers made in existing product designs.375 In this way, the
patent aggregation was aimed at holding up the banks rather than seeking a
return on its inventions.376
Cases such as Aspen Skiing, McWane, and Intellectual Ventures
recognized that intent helps evaluate the credibility of anticompetitive harm.
Incentivizing innovation does not prevent courts from acting against parties
with illicit motives. If the evidence shows that patentees intended to
exclude rivals, condemning them will not discourage budding innovators
from developing and commercializing their innovations. Only those who
intend to exclude rivals by their conduct need to fear. In this way, courts
can reduce false positives while ensuring more robust enforcement where
the facts warrant it.

370

Id.
Id.
372
See 99 F. Supp. 3d 610, 626 (D. Md. 2015).
373
Id. (citation omitted).
374
Id. (citation omitted).
375
Id. (citation omitted).
376
Id.
371
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2. How Intent Makes Judging Easier
Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Diane Wood candidly warned that parties
who spew economic jargon do so “at their peril.”377 For the judge,
navigating neoclassical antitrust’s rule of reason can be like a “ramble
through the wilds of economic theory.”378 Antitrust attorney Richard Steuer
observed that “[t]o a large degree, the backlash against antitrust
enforcement is in reaction to the complexity, and resulting confusion, that
has fostered bad policy decisions, bad enforcement decisions, and bad
judicial decisions.”379 This complexity stems from neoclassical economics’
“inability to translate the rule of reason into simple norms.”380
The technocratic way antitrust jurisprudence has developed has led
courts to shun evidence of intent, preferring instead to point to the
plaintiff’s failure to pierce through the presumptive legality of the
defendant’s conduct. Judges have little understanding of marketplace
economics, whether an agreement keeps the cartel stable, or whether siding
with the patentee will optimize innovation. Even its non-interventionist rule
of reason analysis provides little certainty as to whether courts will find
their conduct reasonable on balance.381
Former FTC Commissioner Thomas Rosch observed that judges
without training find economic evidence more persuasive if “communicated
in a way that a generalist can understand and must be consistent with other
evidence.”382 This includes the introduction of non-price evidence such as
377

Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1767
(1997) (“Economic mumbo-jumbo is already prevalent in the field, but lawyers talk of the tradeoff between the deadweight loss ‘triangle’ and the income transfer ‘rectangle’ at their peril in front
of a judge who does not live and breathe the field.”).
378
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609–10 n.10 (1972).
379
Richard M. Steuer, The Simplicity of Antitrust Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 543, 557 (2012).
380
Stucke, supra note 164, at 1422; see also Cavanagh, supra note 74, at 125
(“Notwithstanding the simplicity of the statutory formulations, application of the antitrust laws to
day-to-day business practices has proven to be no facile undertaking.”).
381
See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238, 2245 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(describing the rule of reason as “unruly” and “amorphous”); Stucke, supra note 164, at 1422
(“The rule of reason simply does not give market participants enough certainty.”).
382
Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, “Intel, Apple, Google, Microsoft, and Facebook:
Observations on Antitrust and the High-Tech Sector,” remarks presented at the ABA Antitrust
Section Fall Forum (Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/public_statements/intel-apple-google-microsoft-and-facebook-observationsantitrust-and-high-tech-sector/101118fallforum.pdf (“Complex economic theories are simply not
comprehensible to many specialists like myself, let alone to a generalist.”).
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intent. By developing a better understanding of the defendant’s intent,
judges can build on a skillset they already use in other types of cases they
routinely adjudicate. Behavioral economics simplifies antitrust analysis by
focusing on qualitative rather than quantitative analysis and provides
explanatory narrative. To the extent that judges need to take into
quantitative evidence, Part IV.A.2 explained why and how algorithms can
be developed to help them crunch data and avoid biases.
Developing our understanding of behavioral economics allows judges to
tap on heuristics to reconcile the benefits of greater sophistication with
simplicity in antitrust adjudication. From the baseline of prohibiting
“ganging up” and “bullying,” courts and agencies can develop other
subcategories that target more specific forms of anticompetitive behavior.383
Reducing the law to norms tech executives can internalize into their daily
business behavior would also help foster a “culture of competition.”384
Finally, simplifying the rule of reason analysis would also facilitate
better access to and administration of justice. A rule that is intuitive to the
lay juror or non-expert judge will give both the parties and decision makers
more confidence that a just result was reached. Doing so would reduce the
hurdles that courts need to put in front of plaintiffs to guard against
vexatious suits by plaintiffs. Parties can ascertain the strength of their
respective positions. If they fail to agree, a judge can do so on a motion to
dismiss or summary judgment. The cost and complexity of litigation would
also be reduced.

D. Market Power and Aftermarkets
Market power reflects the patentees’ power “to raise price[s], reduce
output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm consumers as a result

383
Steuer, supra note 379, at 557 (“It would suffice for counselors, enforcers, and judges to
understand that the beacon of antitrust and competition law is not just maximizing consumer
welfare and economic efficiency, but achieving that goal by confining enforcement to preventing
bullying and ganging up that seriously threatens competition. When decision-makers train the
weapons of the antitrust arsenal on other practices, they run the risk of both reaching the wrong
results and losing public support. When their aim is true, everyone is better off.”).
384
Stucke, supra note 164, at 1423 (“But without this simplicity, the rule of reason leaves
businesses searching in the dark.”); see also Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A New Approach to the
Antitrust Analysis of Mergers, 83 B.U. L. REV. 785, 807 (2003) (arguing rule of reason had
“become so confusing that it precluded antitrust practitioners from advising their clients as to the
legality of particular conduct”).
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diminished competitive constraints or incentives.”385 The first step in
analyzing a merger’s competitive effects is to define the geographic and
product markets.386 Market definition is often decisive to the outcome of a
case.387 Those markets encompass the “‘area of effective
competition’ . . . where buyers can turn for alternate sources of supply.”388

1. Market Power
Products such as drugs and electronics are often patented, with the
differentials softening price competition.389 Patented products are
nonhomogeneous, and their pricing can exacerbate boundedly rational
decisions even in competitive markets. Licensees and consumers subject to
overconfidence biases systematically miscalculate product price and
quality. As firms race to exploit the Big Data available on their consumers,
consumers themselves lack the ability or sophistication to pace sellers and
translate it to aid their decision-making as effectively.390 Customers respond
by ignoring quality revealing information, instead “making choice decisions
mostly based on prior beliefs.”391
It seems odd that in an era where information about products is
abundantly available, the informational asymmetry between patentees and
licensees has never been larger. Firms have a natural head start, since they
385

U.S. Dep’t of Just. & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010) § 1 at 2.
United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 510 (1974).
387
Stucke, supra note 164, at 1426 (“Debates over market definition needlessly consume
litigation resources to such a degree that the litigation’s outcome often hinges on whether the court
adopts the plaintiff’s or defendant’s proposed market definition.”).
388
Morgan, Strand, Wheeler & Biggs v. Radiology, Ltd., 924 F.2d 1484, 1490 (9th Cir. 1991)
(citing Oltz v. St. Peter’s Cmty. Hosp. 861 F.2d 1440, 1446 (9th Cir. 1988)).
389
Tamer Boyacı & Yalçın Akçay, Pricing when Customers have Limited Attention 40
(ESMT, Working Paper 16-01, 2016), available at http://static.esmt.org/publications/working
papers/ESMT-16-01.pdf. (“The benefit of increasing the customer’s ability to distinguish the
products is the softening of price competition, which is already amplified due to difficulties in
learning the true qualities of the products.”).
390
Id. at 2, 5 (“[A]lmost by default, customers not only have limited time and attention, but
also limited capability to process the information that is acquired. . . . The impact of customer’s
cost of information can be translated into suitable information provision strategies for the firm.”);
see also Currie, supra note 21, at 6 (“[S]mart clued-up companies can and will exploit these
predictable deviations. And their capability to do so has increased with the rise of big data and the
huge computing power that can now be deployed. The result can be poor market outcomes that
persist, in which consumer benefit is lower than it could be.”).
391
Boyacı & Akçay, supra note 389, at 40.
386
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have “more experience with the product and [know the] exact quality [of
the products].”392 Behavioral economics highlights the importance of nonprice variables in influencing consumer perceptions of patented technology.
A free good or service would remove the need to measure it against
consumers’ valuation for it and skew their evaluation of its quality.393
Consequently, it fine-tunes the implementation of antitrust law to prevent
patentees from exploiting information asymmetries to create “short-term
shift in the demand curve, altering consumers’ views of their own utility
functions long enough to induce a hard (contractual) commitment to the
transaction.”394

2. Aftermarkets
Nearly every IP product has an aftermarket to which the owner can tie
its sale. The key question is whether antitrust intervention in the
aftermarkets is justified even if there is effective competition on the primary
market. Neoclassical economics regards aftermarket restrictions as
“harmless if there is effective competition in the primary market.”395 The
argument goes that consumers would consider the price and quality of aftersales parts in making their initial purchase.396 Clients dissatisfied with their
deal on the secondary market can simply opt for a rival product in the
primary market. The overall competition between primary products and
their aftermarkets is what counts. Otherwise antitrust could be hijacked to
escape contracts that consumers carelessly entered.
Yet, aftermarket distortions can occur when consumers underestimate
how often they will need secondary products or how much they cost in
aggregate over the life of the primary market product.397 If competitive
pressure from savvy clients is insufficient, behavioral economics provides
additional argument in favor of intervention. For instance, in Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., Kodak sold photocopiers and
392

Id. at 4.
Su, supra note 178, at 83 (“The absence of an explicit price may change consumers’ initial
perceptions and attitudes toward a good or service, by eliminating the cognitive strain that comes
with having to decide how well a set price accords with one’s own sense of intrinsic value of that
good or service.”).
394
Max Huffman, Marrying Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 105,
133 (2012).
395
Heinemann, supra note 11, at 13.
396
See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 465–66 (1992).
397
Heinemann, supra note 11, at 13–14.
393
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provided repair services and parts.398 Independent service organizations
accused Kodak of tying repair services to their photocopiers, which were
protected by its IP.399 The law on tying requires the plaintiff to prove
market power in the tying (repair) market, which in turn depended on
whether lock-in effect created by photocopiers gave it market power.400
In a decision ahead of its time, the Supreme Court wrote “[l]egal
presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market
realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law.”401 The patentee could
have market power in the aftermarket, which it controlled through its
patents, even where the equipment market was highly competitive.402 The
Court noted that informational asymmetries and switching costs could
reduce the cross-elasticity and allow the exercise of market power in the
aftermarket.403
Kodak had that information but had no incentive to disclose it to its
customers. Potential customers lacked that knowledge and acquiring it
would be difficult, since “[t]he information on those costs that is available
to purchasers tends to be anecdotal, and service providers lack incentive to
disclose the data that they possess.”404 Therefore, buyers decide to do so
based on a competitive advertised price and not on the total lifecycle cost.
In situations like Kodak, consumers are vulnerable to hyperbolic
discounting, where future utility is heavily discounted, whereas neoclassical
economics predicts an omniscient consumer who can meter use from the
time of purchase to its disposal.405 Consumers may wrongly anticipate that
they would switch to a new photocopier, but in fact will not do so. A buyer
who is later told there is an additional, undisclosed charge will be more
398

504 U.S. at 455.
Id. at 455–56.
400
Id. at 464.
401
Id. at 466–67.
402
Id. at 471 (“The fact that the equipment market imposes a restraint on prices in the
aftermarkets by no means disproves the existence of power in those markets.”); see also id. at
466–67 (“Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market
realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law. This Court has preferred to resolve antitrust
claims on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the ‘particular facts disclosed by the record.’”).
403
See id. at 473–78.
404
Huffman, supra note 394, at 137.
405
Avishalom Tor, Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, 92 TEX. L. REV. 573, 588 (2014).
(“While perfectly rational consumers in the primary market would have sufficed to deter Kodak
from exploiting aftermarket power, the same does not necessarily hold for boundedly rational
consumers who may systematically underestimate or fail to consider the future costs of parts.”).
399
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inclined to pay that charge than one who learns of the charge before
becoming committed to the purchase. “[B]ehavioral economics suggests
that even small switching costs can have significant effects on consumer
behavior in the presence of consumer inertia, endowment effects, and
default bias. This can, in turn, make foreclosure more likely to occur
through tying and bundling.”406
Switching costs come from sunk costs. Neoclassical economics assumes
people ignore sunk costs once a decision is made to invest in research and
development, and subsequent decisions revolve around marginal losses and
gains.407 However, behavioral research shows that consumers do care about
sunk costs, with one experiment showing that sports fans are more likely to
endure a blizzard if they have already bought a ticket,408 while another
shows that people are more likely to go to every theatre group performance
the more they paid for a season ticket.409 Customers may be “locked-in”
because they are disengaged, amplifying patentee’s market power.410 The
solution to this is to encourage consumer search through disclosure of
pertinent information in an easily understood manner, and prompts to
consider switching, in order to counter consumer inertia. Despite these
efforts, infrequent purchases may limit learning or losses are individually de
minimis even though they are cumulatively significant.
The same issues occur in litigation to resolve disputes over patentee
obligations to license on “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory”
(FRAND) rates.411 Patentees can hold standard essential patents (SEPs)
when implementers’ products read on the patented technology when they
conform to the standard.412 SEP owners can leverage the need to comply
with the standard to augment their market power, and can “holdup”

406

Matthew Bennett, et al., What Does Behavioral Economics Mean for Competition Policy?,
6 COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL 111, 121 (2010).
407
Heinemann, supra note 11, at 7.
408
Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 183, 190
(1999).
409
Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. AND HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124, 127–28 (1985).
410
Currie, supra note 21, at 7 (“[D]isengaged consumers can provide firms with local market
power. If there are many consumers who can’t or won’t search or switch for a better deal, then our
usual assumptions about the efficacy of the competitive process may fail.”).
411
Daryl Lim, Standard Essential Patents, Trolls, and the Smartphone Wars: Triangulating
the End Game, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014).
412
Id. at 3–4.
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implementers by charging implementers more than the value of their
technology due to resulting switching costs.413 SSOs mitigate the risk of
holdups by requiring SEP owners to license on FRAND terms as a
condition of impregnating the standard with their technology.414 While SEP
owners hold the ledger of its licensing terms, implementers have no access
to it, and prior licensees are usually prevented from disclosing those terms
by confidentiality agreements.415 Elsewhere, I have explored the suggestion
of creating a clearinghouse arbitration as a means of addressing this
information asymmetry.416
Further, behavioral economics teaches that the court may be biased
based on the way the royalty is framed. While ten percent of $100 is
numerically identical to one percent of $1,000, the former seems large in
relation to the latter. Accordingly, if the entire market value (EMV) is used
as a base, the concern is that SEP owners may be overpaid as courts will
favor a cognitively more “reasonable” outcome. Behavioral economics
cautions a more nuanced analysis here. It does not purport to provide an
answer to what the “right” royalty should be. Using the “smallest salable
patent-practicing unit” (SSPU) as a base may also result in
undercompensating patentees. One way is to reframe the royalty rate as one
dollar for every $1,000 to simplify the analysis and ameliorate the biases.
Culpability could center around patentee conduct that artificially limits
consumer choice by exploiting information asymmetries and cognitive
limitations resulting in higher prices by making consumers and licensees
less price-sensitive, like tying and exclusive dealing. Such a theory would
fit within the four corners of modern antitrust law’s effects-based approach.

E. Smarter Remedies
Behavioral economics tell us that courts and agencies should be more
creative with antitrust remedies. Nudging, is one such policy instrument.417
413

Id. at 4.
Id.
415
Id. at 50.
416
Id. at 52.
417
Della Bradshaw, How a Little Nudge Can Lead to Better Decisions, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2015, https://www.ft.com/content/e98e2018-70ca-11e5-ad6d-f4ed76f0900a; see also
Peter Ong, How the Right Nudge Can Lead to Constructive Social Behavior, TODAY ONLINE,
June 26, 2015, http://www.todayonline.com/commentary/how-right-nudge-can-lead-constructivesocial-behaviour (telling university students that ninety percent of their peers consumed less than
four drinks during a night out reduced social pressure to binge drink); id. (job seekers who had to
414
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Measuring the wisdom of imposing a behavioral or structural remedy
involves the same kind of uncertainty about the remedy’s effects on the
relevant market as determining whether intervention is appropriate in the
first place.418 The deficiencies of antitrust remedies in high-tech cases have
been criticized as being “painfully apparent” when compared with market
forces and third-party innovation.419 Microsoft imposed interoperability and
other requirements to dilute its market power in the Operating System (OS)
market. Those remedies were criticized as being “an abject failure.”420
Google and Apple eroded its market share,421 and during the smartphone
wars, Microsoft found itself railing against anticompetitive practices of
other tech companies.422
In Europe, Microsoft was found to have technologically tied its Internet
browser and media player app to its operating system.423 Behavioral
economics teaches that consumers tend to stick with the default option
because it is perceived to be the normal choice. Deviating is an act of
commission that requires effort.424 Professor Cass Sunstein observed the
powerful influence of what she termed “choice architecture” on the
decisions we make.425 For instance, people use significantly less paper
when printers are set to the double- rather than single-sided setting.426

sign off on each step of the process had a higher success rate in completing the application process
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options and saved $1.9 billion annually).
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Microsoft: Middle-Aged Blues, ECONOMIST, June 11, 2011, at 68.
422
See Steve Lohr, Antitrust Cry from Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2011, at B1.
423
Emanuele Ciriolo, Do Behavioural Insights Matter for Competition Policy?, COMPETITION
POLICY INT’L (July 2016), at 3.
424
KAHNEMAN, supra note 19, at 413.
425
SUNSTEIN, supra note 192, at 15 (“[I]nfluences on our choices are omnipresent, and we
may not even see them.”).
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In the European Microsoft case, most users (seventy-five percent) did
not download alternative browsers.427 The question then becomes as much
about consumers’ inability to make economically rational choices due to
cognitive limitations as it does a dominant patentee coercing customers
through tying and bundling. That means that fines may not be the best way
to address the issue. Instead, behavioral remedies would be a better option.
Departing from its usual practice of issuing a fine, the European
Commission mandated that Windows users be allowed to choose an
alternative browser through an on-screen ballot box.428 In doing so, the
Commission nudged consumers away from a status quo bias to make an
active choice as to their preferred browser, which one in four did.429 As a
further indication of the efficacy of this remedy, Microsoft’s market share
in the browser market dropped from forty-seven to seventeen percent in
Europe, compared to fifty-five to thirty-two percent in North America,
where no similar measure was adopted.430 The reason for its efficacy was
that the remedy tackled the demand side where consumer behavior was an
important factor in facilitating the anticompetitive harm.

V.

CONCLUSION

Regulating innovation involves making hard choices, but hard choices
are also opportunities for courts to articulate their beliefs and examine the
reasons that govern their choices. Antitrust analysis needs to find the line
separating acceptable conduct from those that should be censured, and
behavioral economics offers an important, but incremental patch to improve
the design and application of antitrust policies to help courts and
government agencies get there. The first step is for decision makers to
recognize the signs that they are in a minefield of biases, slow down, and
tap on the insights behavioral economics offers. It links causation to theory.
It gives more weight to qualitative evidence rather than rely primarily on
abstract econometric data. Market power analysis can be made more
sensitive to evidence of lock-ins and the inability of licensees to engage in
life-cycle pricing. Courts are empowered to use intent evidence, and
determine if a patentee’s procompetitive justifications are merely
pretextual.
427

Ciriolo, supra note 423, at 3.
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429
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In developing behavioral economics at the patent-antitrust intersection,
the FTC and DOJ would be natural laboratories to test and refine its various
applications to cartel, monopolization, and merger scenarios.431 The process
of developing behavioral antitrust works best at the agencies “where it is
possible to test a default rule repeatedly and understand how individuals
will react to that default rule.”432 The FTC has used behavioral economics
in its consumer protection cases.433 There are PhD-level economists that can
marshal their expertise toward developing algorithms and choice
architecture frameworks for adjudicating patent-antitrust disputes that
courts can consider, and in appropriate cases, endorse.434 Both agencies
have expertise in complex and important industries undergirded by patents
such as pharmaceuticals and consumer electronics. Federal appellate courts
also serve a critical role in that they let district courts and parties test drive
rules informed by behavioral economics and see if they succeed in
“nudging” the market in the right direction. Like personalized medicine that
refines a “one-size-fits-all” approach to healthcare, behavioral antitrust does
not displace the neoclassical antitrust analysis. Rather, like a patch, it finetunes its implementation.
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432
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